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PART I: INTRODUCTION 
Comparative fault spread like contemporary wildfires beginning late in 
the 1960s.1  Although there are a few stragglers, it is now the law in forty-six 
states.2  Ultimately, this reform was fueled by a pent-up sense that 
contributory negligence was unfair.3  Why, advocates for comparative fault 
asked, should a loss be borne by one person when two parties acted 
unreasonably to cause that harm?  Properly understood, we believe the same 
sense of fairness should be applied in the case of avoidable consequences, a 
remedial doctrine that imposes a loss entirely on one of two parties who 
unreasonably caused that loss.4 
 
 1. Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Ill. 1981) (documenting the rapid adoption of 
comparative fault through the late 1960s and early 1980s). 
 2. Judge Harrel, dissenting from the Maryland Court of Appeals’ refusal to adopt comparative 
fault, wrote that “forty-six states now employ comparative fault” and explained that the doctrine is 
“no longer a trend . . . of recent vintage, but rather is an established and integral doctrine to the 
negligence systems of nearly every state in the country.”  Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, 
432 Md. 679, 714, 69 A.3d 1149, 1169–70 (Md. 2013) (Harrel J., dissenting).  In his dissent, Judge 
Harrel described contributory negligence as a “fossilized doctrine” that will one day be relegated to 
Maryland’s “judicial tar pit.”  Id. at 696, 69 A.3d at 1158–59.  
 3. When replacing contributory negligence with comparative fault, the California Supreme 
Court wrote: 
It is unnecessary for us to catalogue the enormous amount of critical comment that has 
been directed over the years against the “all-or-nothing” approach of the doctrine of 
contributory negligence.  The essence of that criticism has been constant and clear: the 
doctrine is inequitable in its operation because it fails to distribute responsibility in 
proportion to fault.  Against this have been raised several arguments in justification, but 
none have proved even remotely adequate to the task.  The basic objection to the 
doctrine—grounded in the primal concept that in a system in which liability is based on 
fault, the extent of fault should govern the extent of liability—remains irresistible to 
reason and all intelligent notions of fairness. 
Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1230–31 (Cal. 1975).  See also Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 
431, 437 (Fla. 1973) (replacing contributory negligence with comparative negligence and observing 
that the “latter is simply a more equitable system of determining liability” while the former is a 
“harsh” rule); Sun Oil Co. v. Seamon, 84 N.W.2d 840, 845 (Mich. 1957) (explaining that 
comparative fault is superior to contributory negligence “[n]ot for reasons of abstract symmetry, but 
because of human experience: fault is rarely the monopoly of one party to an accident. . . . Yet the 
doctrine of contributory negligence so treats it in our court today, denying the fundamental principle 
of right and justice that juries weigh the merits and demerits of each of the parties to a 
controversy.”); Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 882 (W. Va. 1979) (“There is 
an almost universal dissatisfaction among leading scholars of tort law with the harshness of the 
doctrine of contributory negligence . . . . A plaintiff can, if the jury is faithful to the contributory 
negligence instruction it receives, be barred from recovery if his negligence ‘contributed in the 
slightest degree’ to the accident . . . . Thus, our system of jurisprudence, while based on concepts of 
justice and fair play, contains an anomaly in which the slightest negligence of a plaintiff precludes 
any recovery and thereby excuses the defendant from the consequences of all of his negligence, 
however great it may be.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 4. As Gary Schwartz compellingly demonstrated, the question of whether contributory or 
comparative negligence provides better deterrence incentives is endlessly problematic and cannot 
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One must appreciate that comparative fault’s widespread adoption 
revolutionized contemporary tort law in three ways.  First, it replaced 
contributory negligence—the all-or-nothing imposition of party liability—
with a fine-grained method of apportionment among the responsible parties.  
Second, it created a ripple effect that transformed many doctrines developed 
with contributory negligence as their foundation.  Third, and less appreciated 
by courts and commentators, comparative fault caused tension with existing, 
unrelated doctrines that nevertheless depended on contributory negligence, 
which assured that plaintiffs recovered only when they had not acted culpably 
(i.e., only innocent plaintiffs could successfully recover from a defendant).5  
In 1985, Justice Ryan of the Illinois Supreme Court wrote: 
[C]omparative negligence . . . has given us a wonderful 
opportunity to break from the artificial concepts and doctrines of 
the past.  This is difficult to do because . . . we have become so 
accustomed to thinking in terms of contributory negligence and 
the many doctrines that evolved to avoid its harshness that it is 
difficult to view a case solely on the basis of pure comparative 
fault.  However, we must remember that we are writing on a clean 
slate.  We should therefore strive to apply to all actions arising 
under the common law the fairness doctrine of . . . comparative 
fault so that each person stands responsible for the share of the 
injuries attributable to him.  We no longer have to think in the 
nebulous terms of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, 
 
be answered on a categorical basis.  See Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative 
Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697, 704 (1978).  Given the powerful case for fairness 
and the uncertain matter of deterrence, we focus on fairness in this article and put aside efficiency. 
 5. Michael D. Green, The Unanticipated Ripples of Comparative Negligence: Superseding 
Cause in Products Liability and Beyond, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1103, 1103 (2002) (“[L]ike a stone thrown 
into a pond, the ripple effects of comparative negligence are far broader than merely removing the 
bar to recovery by a negligent plaintiff.  We might think of the first ring of effects as the abolition 
of doctrines developed to ameliorate the harshness of contributory negligence, including last clear 
chance and stricter rules of proximate cause for plaintiff contributory negligence.  But there are 
several more and larger rings of ripples that cut a wide swath across tort law.  Indeed, the breadth 
and depth of the impact of comparative negligence on tort law belies the conception that 
comparative fault merely changes the rule about apportioning liability between a negligent plaintiff 
and defendant.”); see also Guido Calabresi & Jeffrey O. Cooper, New Directions in Tort Law, 30 
VAL. U. L. REV. 859, 868 (1996) (“[The widespread adoption of comparative fault] we believe, is 
as important for tort law as was the coming of insurance seventy years ago.  Like that earlier change, 
it is slowly making its way through the whole of tort law and redirecting the development of 
different doctrines, one after another.”); Robert L. Rabin, Past as Prelude: The Legacy of Five 
Landmarks in Twentieth Century Injury Law, in EXPLORING TORT LAW (M. Stuart Madden ed. 
2005) (identifying the adoption of comparative fault and its replacing the all-or-nothing approach 
of contributory negligence as one of the five most significant developments in tort law in the 
twentieth century). 
   
2021] RESCUING AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES 383 
 
misuse of the product, failure to discover, mitigation of damages, 
avoidable consequences, and the like.6 
For the most part, the doctrines Justice Ryan identified as requiring 
modification in the wake of comparative fault are quite obvious and have 
evolved with post-comparative-fault jurisprudence.  As such, nearly every 
state has recognized that comparative fault implicitly abrogated rules such as 
last clear chance and assumption of risk.7  Even the doctrine of joint and 
several liability—which places the risk of insolvency on one or more 
culpable defendants rather than on an innocent plaintiff—transformed fairly 
quickly as plaintiffs were no longer required to be entirely innocent under 
comparative fault.8  However, court appreciation regarding the full impact of 
comparative fault—which, again, means that defendants need not be the only 
culpable party in tort—on doctrines peripheral to apportionment of liability 
has been slow and stuttering.  For instance, most courts took a number of 
years, often with the aid of scholarship, to recognize comparative fault’s 
impact on doctrines such as intervening cause,9 wrongful acts,10 and defenses 
to intentional torts.11  Comparative fault’s ripple effects, however, continue 
 
 6. Simpson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 483 N.E.2d 1, 7 (Ill. 1985) (Ryan J., dissenting); see also 
Green, supra note 5, at 1103. 
 7. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572h (2020) (“The legal doctrines of last clear chance 
and assumption of risk in actions to which this section is applicable are abolished.”); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 31.620 (2020) (“The doctrine of last clear chance is abolished . . . The doctrine of implied 
assumption of the risk is abolished.”); MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (2020) (“The doctrine of last clear 
chance is abolished.”); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1242 (Cal. 1975) (“[L]ast clear chance 
and assumption of risk . . . are to be subsumed under the general process of assessing liability in 
proportion to fault”). 
 8. MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 452 (10th ed. 2016) (“Joint 
and several liability came under fire after the adoption of comparative fault, which meant that even 
culpable plaintiffs could recover damages, and because of the perceived unfairness to some 
‘peripheral’ defendants who nevertheless were solvent when other ‘primary’ defendants were far 
more culpable and insolvent.”).  Notably, the five jurisdictions that retain contributory negligence 
all continue to impose joint and several liability.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 17 cmt. a , Reporters’ Note (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 9. Green, supra note 5, at 1135. 
 10. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS: CONCLUDING PROVISIONS pp. § 4A (P.D. No. 1 
Mar. 13, 2020) (providing that plaintiffs are not barred from recovery merely because they were 
engaged in illegal or wrongful conduct when suffering harm). 
 11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 50 (P.D. No. 7 
Aug. 7, 2020); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 1 cmt. 
c, Reporters’ Note (AM. LAW INST. 2000).  England, Canada, and New Zealand have interpreted 
their comparative fault statutes to permit apportionment of fault to plaintiffs in intentional tort cases.  
See W.V.H. ROGERS, ET. AL., WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ ON TORT 234 n.65 (15th ed. 1998); ALLEN 
M. LINDEN, CANADIAN TORT LAW 94–95 (6th ed. 1997); Hoebergen v. Koppens, [1974] 2 N.Z.L.R. 
597, 603.  For a provocative claim that criminal law reflects aspects of comparative responsibility 
analyses, especially when the victim has provoked the attack, see Alon Harel, Efficiency and 
Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case for a Criminal Law Principle of Comparative Fault, 82 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1181, 1211–26 (1994). 
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radiating outward, touching doctrines that are even less obvious to courts; 
indeed, many such doctrines remain largely unrecognized today.12  The 
subject of this Article, then, is another tort provision that requires 
reconsideration in the wake of comparative fault’s radiating implications: 
avoidable consequences.13  The same fundamental fairness concern that 
animated comparative fault applies when employing avoidable consequences 
to bar a plaintiff’s recovery for harm for which both the plaintiff and 
defendant are responsible.14 
Avoidable consequences—distinguished from mitigation of 
damages15—is nominally a remedial doctrine that bars plaintiffs from 
recovering for enhanced or aggravated harms that the plaintiff could 
reasonably have avoided.16  A quintessential illustration of this doctrine 
involves a plaintiff who suffers a leg injury due to the defendant’s negligent 
 
 12. For example, the doctrine of alternative causation recognized in Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 
1, 4 (Cal. 1948), the landmark case involving two hunters who fired negligently but only one of 
whom caused the plaintiff’s harm, is another rule that may be affected by comparative fault.  The 
burden-shifting rule adopted by the California Supreme Court, as is the case with other doctrines 
ameliorating the plaintiff’s obligation to prove causation, was justified on the basis that culpable 
defendants should bear the consequences of a lack of evidence rather than an innocent plaintiff.  
After comparative fault, however, plaintiffs may no longer be entirely innocent with respect to their 
injuries.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 1 cmt. c, 
Reporters’ Note (AM. LAW INST. 2000).  For other doctrines requiring re-examination, see Green, 
supra note 5, at 1106–07. 
 13. Notwithstanding Justice Ryan’s identification of it in the quotation above.  See supra note 
6 and accompanying text. 
 14. One problematic aspect of avoidable consequences involves determining whether the 
plaintiff’s post-injury conduct was unreasonable and therefore subject to the rule’s recovery bar.  
We put aside this aspect of avoidable consequences because it is not implicated in the question of 
how to apportion damages once the plaintiff’s failure to avoid is determined to be unreasonable.  
Whether a plaintiff has acted unreasonably in failing to undergo a risky procedure, such as surgery, 
is a difficult matter with which courts struggle.  Particularly challenging are cases in which plaintiffs 
decline medical treatment because of their religious belief—which could require juries to determine 
that following one’s religious beliefs was unreasonable.  See, e.g., Rozewicz v. N.Y.C. Health & 
Hosps. Corp., 656 N.Y.S.2d 593, 594 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (noting that such claim about a Jehovah’s 
Witness “raised some of the most difficult legal issues I have been faced with during my years on 
the Bench”); see generally Jeremy Pomeroy, Note, Reason, Religion, and Avoidable Consequences: 
When Faith and the Duty to Mitigate Collide, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1111 (1992). 
 15. Avoidable consequences applies to injury-enhancing plaintiff misconduct that occurs after 
the defendant’s initial tort.  Mitigation of damages refers to injury-enhancing plaintiff misconduct 
that precedes or coincides with the defendant’s tort.  We discuss this distinction further, infra at 
notes 34–36 and accompanying text.  We note an important terminological matter: Courts frequently 
use “avoidable consequences” and “mitigation of damages” interchangeably.  To avoid confusion 
and clarify analysis, we maintain their technical definitions and nomenclature.   
 16. See, e.g., Weston v. Dun Transp., 695 S.E.2d 279, 282 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (“Under the 
doctrine of avoidable consequences . . . ‘[i]f the plaintiff by ordinary care could have avoided the 
consequences to himself [or herself] caused by the defendant’s negligence, [the plaintiff] is not 
entitled to recover.’”) (internal citation omitted). 
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operation of an automobile.17  Notwithstanding this injury, the plaintiff goes 
skiing a few days after the accident despite doctors’ orders to keep weight off 
the leg.  In so doing, the plaintiff acts unreasonably and aggravates the leg 
injury.  Avoidable consequences bars the plaintiff from recovering damages 
for this enhanced harm from the defendant.18  To be sure, the plaintiff will 
still recover damages for the initial injury, but must bear the entire loss for 
the enhanced harm despite the defendant’s role in causing it.19 
In this manner, avoidable consequences is a complete bar for enhanced 
injuries caused20 by both a defendant’s and the plaintiff’s unreasonable 
conduct.  If the preceding sentence sounds eerily familiar, it might be because 
avoidable consequences mirrors contributory negligence.21  Of course, unlike 
the complete bar of avoidable consequences, plaintiff negligence no longer 
operates as a bar to recovery in comparative fault jurisdictions.  Instead, 
under comparative fault, a plaintiff’s unreasonable conduct reduces recovery 
based on the plaintiff’s comparative share of responsibility for the harm.22  
Theoretically, then, “any negligence by a plaintiff that . . . aggravates [his or 
her] injuries should reduce (not bar) the plaintiff’s recovery . . . of that 
portion of the damages.”23 
 
 17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 3 cmt. b, illus. 4 & 5 
(AM. LAW INST. 2000).  
 18. See, e.g., Kocher v. Getz, 824 N.E.2d 671, 675 (Ind. 2005) (explaining that “[a] plaintiff 
‘may not recover for any [post-accident] item of damage that [the plaintiff] could have avoided 
through the use of reasonable care.’”) (internal citation omitted); Gross v. Knuth, 471 P.2d 648, 650 
(Colo. App. 1970) (“The doctrine of avoidable consequences . . . applies after a legal wrong has 
occurred, but while damages may still be averted, and bars recovery only for such damages.”).  
 19. After all, if the defendant never injured the plaintiff in the first place, then the plaintiff 
would not have an injury to enhance. 
 20. We use “cause” to mean factual causation and rely on the Third Restatement’s adoption of 
a but-for standard for factual causation.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR 
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).  By contrast, and also consistent 
with the Third Restatement, we use “scope of liability,” often denominated “proximate cause,” to 
refer to limits on the liability of a defendant who has tortiously caused harm. See id. Chapter 6 
Special Note on Proximate Cause at 492.  A comparable concept is applicable to a plaintiff’s 
unreasonable conduct, which, when applicable, would remove that negligent conduct from 
consideration for apportioning liability.  “Scope of liability” is an awkward term to use with regard 
to plaintiff negligence, as liability is not imposed on plaintiffs.  Instead, we use the term “scope of 
responsibility” when addressing the same matter as scope of liability with regard to plaintiff 
negligent conduct. 
 21. See, e.g., FRANKLIN, supra note 8, at 435 (explaining contributory negligence).  For a more 
extensive discussion on the similarities between avoidable consequences and contributory 
negligence, see Yehuda Adar, Comparative Negligence and Mitigation of Damages: Two Sister 
Doctrines in Search of Reunion, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 783, 799 (2013), and Part III.A, infra. 
 22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 7 (AM. LAW INST. 
2000).  Once comparative fault replaced the all-or-nothing method of apportioning liability between 
plaintiffs and defendants, comparative contribution logically followed, displacing the prior pro rata 
method of apportionment.  
 23. Id. at § 3 cmt. b, ReporterS’ Note. 
  
386 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80:380 
 
Today, almost half a century after the adoption of comparative fault, 
only a minority of courts—roughly eleven—has addressed the tension 
between comparative fault and the complete bar of avoidable consequences.24  
Of those that have dealt with avoidable consequences in a post-contributory-
negligence world, eight courts revised avoidable consequences to align with 
comparative fault,25 and three courts ruled that comparative fault had no 
effect on avoidable consequences.26  The vast majority of courts, however, 
has failed to recognize this tension.27  As we explain below, this short-
 
 24. See infra notes 176 & 189.  
 25. See infra note 176.  Eight courts have modified their approach to avoidable consequences 
in response to comparative fault, replacing its operation as a per se bar, in some cases because a 
statute modeled on the Uniform Comparative fault Act, see below, had been enacted in the state.  A 
ninth court, the Supreme Court of Vermont, expressed strong support for comparative fault 
subsuming avoidable consequences in dicta, but chose not to decide the issue since neither party 
had briefed the issue.  Langlois v. Town of Proctor, 113 A.3d 44, 55–56 (Vt. 2014).  We note here 
that Professor Adar, addressing the modification of avoidable consequences after the widespread 
adoption of comparative fault, wrote:  
Under the Restatement’s approach, [avoidable consequences] should merely reduce 
the . . . tortfeasor’s liability . . . rather than eliminate it altogether.  Surprisingly enough, 
this revolutionary proposition has escaped the attention of the Anglo-American legal 
community.  It has barely been mentioned by American courts and has not yet been 
discussed in the academic literature.  
Adar, supra note 21, at 785.  This “barely mentioned” claim is inaccurate.  As stated in the text, 
twelve courts (including the Vermont Supreme Court, which did not decide the issue) have 
confronted and discussed this issue.  Of those courts, the majority agree with the Restatement 
approach, although many of them did so without reference to the Restatement.  In addition, four of 
those opinions predate the Restatement’s position published in 2000.  See infra note 176.  Moreover, 
the idea that the Restatement approach to avoidable consequences is revolutionary and not 
mentioned in legal literature is belied by the work of the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws, which twice has promulgated model state statutes that would do the same.  See 
UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1 (NAT’L CONF. COMM’RS 1977); UNIF. APPORTIONMENT OF 
TORT RESPONSIBILITY ACT § 3 (NAT’L CONF. COMM’RS 2002).  Both of the major contemporary 
torts treatises address the matter as do a number of torts casebooks.  See infra note 33; DAN B. DOBB 
ET AL., TORTS AND COMPENSATION 310 (8th ed. 2017) (addressing avoidable consequences in the 
comparative fault chapter and criticizing the all-or-nothing approach to the doctrine as wrong 
because “defendant is clearly a but-for cause of the [enhanced] harm and [it] also seems to be 
withing the scope of risk defendant created”); FRANKLIN, supra note 8, at 461–64 (covering 
avoidable consequences in the section of text on comparative fault); DAVID W. ROBERTSON ET AL., 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 414–19 (5th ed. 2017) (addressing avoidable consequences and 
mitigation of harm in the section of text on contributory and comparative negligence); VICTOR E. 
SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE, AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 676–77 
(14th ed. 2020) (discussing avoidable consequences as an aspect of comparative fault). 
 26. See infra notes 189–194 and accompanying text.  
 27. The remaining courts have failed to consider the interplay between avoidable consequences 
and comparative fault.  These courts simply cite to, and apply, avoidable consequences precedent 
without mentioning comparative fault.  See, e.g., Tedd Bish Farm, Inc. v. Sw. Fencing Servs., LLC, 
867 N.W.2d 265, 271–73 (Neb. 2015) (employing avoidable consequences without reference to 
comparative fault); Flemings v. State, 19 So.3d 1220, 1228–30 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (employing an 
avoidable consequences analysis, but discussing it separately from—and without referencing—
comparative fault); Tabieros v. Clark Equip. Co., 944 P.2d 1279, 1314–17 (Haw. 1997) (same, but 
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sightedness appears to stem from the longstanding conception that avoidable 
consequences is a remedial matter and therefore unrelated to substantive 
doctrines that constitute an affirmative defense.28  Regardless of the reason, 
this application of avoidable consequences resurrects contributory 
negligence in a postcomparative-fault world and is fundamentally 
inconsistent with contemporary apportionment principles.29  Moreover, of the 
three courts that have refused to modify avoidable consequences after the 
adoption of comparative fault, only one has meaningfully confronted the 
tension between avoidable consequences and comparative fault—and, 
unfortunately, that court’s opinion reveals basic misunderstandings about tort 
law and how apportionment of liability works.30  
Professor Oscar S. Gray—to whom we dedicate this Article—worked 
tirelessly to reform and clarify tort law,31 advocating for coherence and 
fairness.32  Indeed, Professor Gray championed comparative fault and was 
one of the many torts scholars who recognized the incompatibility of 
avoidable consequences with modern apportionment schemes.33  This 
Article, then, seeks to honor Professor Gray’s memory by resolving an 
incoherency in tort law and upholding comparative fault’s apportionment 
 
using “mitigation of damages” to mean “avoidable consequences”); Automatic Merchandisers, Inc. 
v. Ward, 646 P.2d 553, 554 (Nev. 1982) (same).  In addition, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
REMEDIES § 7 cmt. h Reporters’ Note (P.D. 1 Oct. 14, 2020) (“Most avoidable-consequences 
opinions proceed without reference to comparative responsibility.”). 
 28. A common refrain in avoidable consequences cases is that avoidable consequences only 
affects “damages” rather than liability.  Thus, according to this argument, the doctrine is distinct 
from liability-determinative doctrines, such as contributory negligence or comparative fault.  See 
infra note 96.  Part III.A takes issue with this distinction. 
 29. See infra Part III.A. 
 30. See infra Part III.B.  As explained in that subpart, only Kocher v. Getz, 824 N.E.2d 671 
(Ind. 2005) provides meaningful discussion regarding the tension between avoidable consequences 
and comparative fault.  The other two cases that reach the same conclusion provide no substantive 
rationale. 
 31. In Memoriam: Oscar S. Gray, AM. LAW INST. (Oct. 9, 2019), 
https://www.ali.org/news/articles/memoriam-oscar-s-gray/. 
 32. A Celebration of the Life for Oscar Gray, UNIV. MD. (Dec. 10, 2019), 
https://mediasite.umaryland.edu/Mediasite/Play/130a00107c5a453dbefa8e0074e0bf641d.   
 33. Professor Gray and his coauthors explained that “[i]n principle, the plaintiff’s failure to take 
reasonable steps to avoid certain damages caused by the defendant’s negligence should serve merely 
to reduce the plaintiff’s recovery for those damages in a comparative negligence jurisdiction, rather 
than to bar such recovery.”  FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS § 
25.4, at 604 (3d ed. 2007).  Another treatise explains “[w]ith the adoption of comparative fault 
regimes in most states, the remaining role of the avoidable consequences or mitigation of damages 
approach has been called into question.”  DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK ON TORTS § 16.10, at 
404 (2d ed. 2016).  The American Law Institute, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2000), and the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws agree that avoidable consequences should not operate to 
per se bar plaintiff recovery for enhanced harms.  See Unif. Comp. Fault Act § 1 (1977); UNIF. 
APPORTIONMENT OF TORT RESPONSIBILITY ACT § 3 (2002). 
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precepts because of the fundamental fairness that led to its adoption.  To that 
end, the thesis of this Article is simple: avoidable consequences should not 
bar recovery for enhanced harm caused also by the plaintiff’s unreasonable 
failure to mitigate; instead, the damages for the enhanced injury should be 
apportioned among all of those whose tortious conduct caused that harm.  
Before proceeding further, clarity requires that we distinguish avoidable 
consequences from a similar rule known as mitigation of damages.  Although 
courts frequently use these terms interchangeably,34 we maintain their 
technical distinction for the sake of clarity and to highlight the incoherency 
in treating them differently for apportionment purposes.  As explained above, 
avoidable consequences refers to unreasonable, post-injury plaintiff conduct 
that enhances the plaintiff’s harm.  Mitigation of damages, on the other hand, 
refers to injury-enhancing plaintiff misconduct that precedes or coincides 
with the initial tort.35  The distinction between avoidable consequences and 
mitigation of damages rests on the temporal relationship between the 
plaintiff’s injury-enhancing negligence and the initial injury.  Today, 
virtually all courts recognize that comparative responsibility governs 
apportionment for mitigation of damages; that is, injury-enhancing plaintiff 
fault that predates or coincides with the plaintiff’s injury is, universally, a 
factor in comparative fault apportionment rather than a recovery bar for the 
enhanced harm.36  
 
 34. E.g., Cobb v. Snohomish County, 935 P.2d 1384, 1389 (Wash. 1997) (“The doctrine of 
avoidable consequences, also known as mitigation of damages, prevents recovery for damages the 
injured party could have avoided through reasonable efforts.”); Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568, 573 
n.9 (5th Cir. 1991) (“Courts frequently use the phrases ‘avoidable consequences’ and ‘mitigation of 
damages’ interchangeably.”); Gottsch Feeding Corp. v. Red Cloud Cattle Co., 429 N.W.2d 328, 333 
(Neb. 1988) (“[T]he ‘doctrine of avoidable consequences’ is but another name for that which is 
more commonly referred to as the failure to mitigate damages.”). 
 35. See, e.g., Law v. Superior Court In & For Maricopa Cty., 755 P.2d 1135, 1138 (Ariz. 1988) 
(relating to the plaintiff’s pre-injury failure to wear a seatbelt); Waterson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 544 
A.2d 357, 359 (N.J. 1988) (same); Melesko v. Riley, 339 A.2d 479, 479 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1975) 
(same). 
 36. The vast majority of courts apply comparative fault to plaintiff misconduct that precedes or 
coincides with the initial harm.  See, e.g., Law, 755 P.2d at 1145; Kimbrough v. Anderson, 55 
N.E.3d 325, 337 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (explaining that comparative fault applies to plaintiff’s pre-
injury conduct); Walter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 748 A.2d 961, 969 (Me. 2000); Burrell ex rel. 
Schatz v. O’Reilly Auto., Inc., 175 S.W.3d 642, 651 n.10 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (“[P]re-accident fault 
is properly submitted by a comparative fault instruction.”); Shuette v. Beazer Homes Holdings 
Corp., 124 P.3d 530, 546 (Nev. 2005) (in the course of addressing class certification, explaining 
that comparative fault governs pre-injury plaintiff conduct); Ostrowski v. Azzara, 545 A.2d 148, 
152 (N.J. 1988) (“Avoidable consequences, then, normally comes into action when the injured 
party’s carelessness occurs after the defendant’s legal wrong has been committed. Contributory 
negligence, however, comes into action when the injured party’s carelessness occurs before 
defendant’s wrong has been committed or concurrently with it.); Nabors Well Servs., Ltd. v. 
Romero, 456 S.W.3d 553, 563 (Tex. 2015) (“[W]e conclude that . . . the [comparative fault 
statute] . . . requires fact-finders to consider relevant evidence of a plaintiff’s pre-occurrence, injury-
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Part II of this Article outlines fundamental tort principles that are central 
to the apportionment enterprise.37  Understanding these principles is essential 
to understanding how avoidable consequences contravenes them.  
Importantly, and unfortunately, the avoidable consequences (and mitigation 
of harm) case law is rife with courts that do not understand these principles.  
Part III, then, details how avoidable consequences violates these 
fundamentals, both in court application and justification.38  By way of 
preview, avoidable consequences operates like the outdated and abandoned 
doctrine of contributory negligence.39  Moreover, justifications for this 
application of avoidable consequences in a number of jurisdictions fails to 
appreciate the apportionment principles laid out in Part II.  First, some courts 
fail to understand the appropriate causal inquiry in tort law by addressing the 
causes of the injury-causing accident (or initial harm) rather than the causes 
of the plaintiff’s multiple harms.40  In addition, another justification for 
avoidable consequences—that the plaintiff’s post-injury conduct is a 
superseding cause of the enhanced harm41—is untenable in a comparative 
fault world.  This is also true of the efforts to distinguish avoidable 
consequences from mitigation of damages based on the differing temporal 
relationship between the plaintiff’s initial injury and enhanced harm.42  
Finally, some courts and commentators reveal a fundamental 
misunderstanding of apportionment principles by claiming that subsuming 
avoidable consequences into comparative fault would cause greater 
unfairness in modified comparative fault jurisdictions.43  Part IV provides a 
solution consistent with the apportionment principles explained in Part II, 
which would apportion the enhanced harm due to avoidable consequences 
among the parties responsible for that harm, rather than barring all recovery 
for it.44  Part V concludes.45   
 
causing conduct.”).  See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: REMEDIES § 7 cmt. b (P.D. 1 Oct. 
14, 2020) (“[C]omparative responsibility applies to the plaintiff’s conduct before or simultaneously 
with the tort, and avoidable consequences applies to plaintiff’s conduct after the tort.”).  But see 
Weston v. Dun Transp., 695 S.E.2d 279, 282 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (barring plaintiff’s claim due to 
pre-accident negligence notwithstanding the jurisdiction’s adoption of comparative fault). 
 37. See infra Part II. 
 38. See infra Part III. 
 39. See infra Part III.A. 
 40. See infra Part III.B. 
 41. See infra Part III.C. 
 42. See infra Part III.D.  The “other doctrine” mentioned here is mitigation of damages. 
 43. See infra Part III.E. 
 44. See infra Part IV. 
 45. See infra Part V. 
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PART II. APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY PRINCIPLES: THE TWO-STEP 
PROCESS, CAUSATION BEFORE FAULT 
To understand how avoidable consequences conflicts with comparative 
fault principles, we set forth fundamental tort principles for apportioning 
liability, which require attention to both causation and comparative fault 
when the plaintiff contributed to some portion of his or her harm.  Subpart A 
briefly covers these principles.  Subpart B explains how these principles 
relate to cases involving enhanced harms.  
A. First,  Apportionment  is on the Basis of Causation; Second, 
Liability is Apportioned Based on Comparative Responsibility for 
Indivisible Harms 
There are two distinct concepts involved in apportioning liability: 
cause46  and fault.47  Courts and legislatures, however, sometimes fail to 
appreciate that these are discrete tools for apportionment.48  Thus, 
apportionment is a two-step process, first requiring identification of the 
indivisible harms suffered by the plaintiff (if there is more than one harm) 
and the parties responsible for each of those harms.49  In an ordinary case in 
which the plaintiff suffers a single injury, this step is unnecessary because all 
liable parties were a cause of the sole indivisible harm.  However, causal 
apportionment is essential when the plaintiff has suffered more than one 
 
 46. See Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 15 S.W.3d 425, 433 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) 
(“Causation in fact is an all-or-nothing proposition . . . . While there may be different degrees of 
liability or fault, specific conduct is either a cause in fact, or it is not.”) (internal citation omitted).  
Thus, there is no such thing as comparative causation. 
 47. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 26(a) (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000) (“When damages for an injury can be divided by causation, the factfinder first divides 
them into their indivisible component parts and separately apportions liability for each indivisible 
component”). 
 48. See, e.g., Webb v. Navistar, 692 A.2d 343, 351 (Vt. 1996) (using “comparative causation” 
to mean “comparative fault”); Sparks v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 32 Cal App. 4th 461, 471 (1995) 
(conflating causal apportionment with comparative fault); Protectus Alpha Navigation Co. v. North 
Pac. Grain Growers, Inc., 767 F.2d 1379, 1383–84 (9th Cir. 1985) (apportioning on the basis of 
causation without any consideration of comparative fault); Kalland v. North Am. Van Lines, 716 
F.2d 570, 573 (9th Cir. 1983) (same). 
 49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 26 cmt. c (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000) (explaining that the two-step apportionment process apportions first on causation and 
then on relative party fault for indivisible harms).  We note that the causal inquiry in tort law 
addresses the causes of the plaintiff’s harm.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR 
PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“Tortious conduct must be a factual 
cause of harm for liability to be imposed.”).  Some courts employing avoidable consequences fail 
to appreciate this basic tenet, instead looking to the causes of the initial accident.  See, e.g., Kocher 
v. Getz, 824 N.E.2d 671, 675 (Ind. 2005) (refusing to consider the plaintiff’s enhanced harms under 
comparative fault because the plaintiff’s post-accident conduct did not cause the initial accident); 
see also infra Part III.B. 
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harm.  Fundamentally, only those who tortiously cause harm are liable for 
it.50  The corollary of this principle, putting aside difficulties of proof,51 is 
that parties do not pay for what they do not cause.52  We cannot emphasize 
enough the importance of this first step.  A recurrent theme throughout 
avoidable consequences cases (and the critique of them in Part III) is the 
failure of courts to appreciate that frequently there are two harms: the initial 
one suffered by the plaintiff and another enhanced harm to which the plaintiff 
contributed by failing to take reasonable steps to mitigate it.53 
Thus, the first step in apportioning liability is to determine who caused 
each of the plaintiff’s multiple harms.54  If multiple parties contribute to 
multiple, discrete plaintiff harms (each an “indivisible injury”), each party 
can only be liable for the harm or harms that party caused.55  Consider two 
drivers, Avery and Brielle, who negligently run over the plaintiff at the same 
time.  Avery runs over the plaintiff’s right arm and Brielle runs over the 
plaintiff’s left leg.  Avery would be liable only for the injury to the plaintiff’s 
arm, and Brielle would be liable only for the injury to the plaintiff’s leg, 
because neither one caused the other injury.  
Fault apportionment, the second step in the apportionment process, 
arises only after the plaintiff’s harms have been divided by causation into 
indivisible harms56—i.e., discrete harms that are each caused by a different 
 
 50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 26 cmt. a (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000) (“No party should be liable for harm it did not cause, and an injury caused by two or 
more persons should be apportioned according to their respective shares of comparative 
responsibility.”). 
 51. When evidence is insufficient to determine which parties caused what harm, allocation of 
the burden of proof may result in a party paying for more or less of the harm than it caused.  See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 26 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 
2000).  That misallocation is by necessity, not design.  
 52. See supra note 50; see also Robert N. Strassfeld, Causal Comparisons, 60 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 913, 918–20 n.21 (1992) (collecting authorities). 
 53. There may be cases in which, had the plaintiff taken reasonable steps to mitigate, he or she 
would have suffered no harm, in which case this first step is unnecessary.  Our reading of the cases 
is that, because courts fail to appreciate the necessity of this first step, they do not attend to whether 
the case involves a single harm, as described above, or an initial harm and enhanced harm due to 
the failure to mitigate.  The latter is the more frequent case by a wide margin. 
 54. See Waste Mgmt., Inc., 15 S.W.3d at 433; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 26 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2000).  See also Gerald W. Boston, 
Apportionment of Harm in Tort Law: A Proposed Restatement, 21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 267 (1996) 
(explaining the history of courts failing to apportion causally by laxly determining what constituted 
an indivisible injury and advocating for more rigorous attention to identifying discrete injuries 
suffered by plaintiffs and apportioning first on the causes of each discrete injury). 
 55. This is equally true whether the jurisdiction employs joint and several liability, several 
liability, or some hybrid of the two.  Those doctrines address only how liability will be apportioned 
among defendants who have caused it when there is insolvency of one or more of them. 
 56. We note that it can be difficult to determine whether a harm is indivisible.  Roy D. Jackson, 
Jr., Joint Torts and Several Liability, 17 TEX. L. REV. 399, 420 (1939) (“This article has attempted 
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set of parties.57  If, for instance, Avery and Brielle both ran over the plaintiff’s 
torso in addition to Avery running over the plaintiff’s arm and Brielle running 
over the plaintiff’s leg, Avery and Brielle would both be liable for the harm 
to the plaintiff’s torso in addition to their liability for the discrete harms to 
the plaintiff’s extremities.58  At this point, since both Avery and Brielle 
caused harm to the plaintiff’s torso, apportionment between them would be 
based on comparative fault.59  
Let us extend the simple illustration of Avery and Brielle to a case that 
implicates plaintiff fault and enhanced harm, a circumstance closer (though 
 
to distinguish between divisible and indivisible torts.  Such a distinction is a difficult one to make, 
and, at best, frequently controversial.”); Michael D. Green, A Future for Asbestos Apportionment?, 
12 CONN. INS. L.J. 315 (2006) (surveying apportionment issues faced by courts in asbestos cases).  
While exploring the complications of divisibility is beyond the scope of this article, we observe one 
quintessential example of an injury that many consider to be indivisible but arguably is not: death.  
Death might seem like an indivisible injury because, after all, someone is either dead or not, and—
unlike causally apportioning the arm damage to Avery and the leg damage to Brielle in the above 
example—it is not obvious how death might be causally apportioned.  That said, when we examine 
the measure of damages for wrongful death, we discover that it is not death per se for which damages 
are awarded but for losses reflecting the amount of earnings the decedent would have made through 
employment.  FRANKLIN, supra note 8, at 744–45.  Thus, consider a wrongful death action for a 
decedent exposed to two different toxic agents, one that accelerated his death by five years and the 
other that accelerated his death by ten years.  In addition, assume that the exposure to each toxic 
agent was caused by a different defendant.  Damages would be causally apportioned between the 
defendants based on their contribution to diminishing the decedent’s survival for each of the two 
periods.  Cf. Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co., 163 A. 111, 115 (N.H. 1932) (addressing a 
child who fell off of a bridge but who was electrocuted during his fall and concluding that, if the 
fall would have resulted in his death a few seconds later, damages against the electric company 
should be drastically reduced).  Indeed, all cases of death are about depriving the decedent of some 
number of years (or less, as in Dillon) of life, as even in the absence of the “wrongful death,” the 
decedent would have eventually died at some later time.  See FRANKLIN, supra note 8, at 744–45.  
To generalize, time may be a basis for making death or other harms divisible by accelerating their 
occurrence and thereby enable causal apportionment.  
 57. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 26 cmt. g (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000) (“Damages are indivisible, and thus the injury is indivisible, when all legally culpable 
conduct of the plaintiff and every tortious act of the defendants and other relevant persons caused 
all the damages.”).  Importantly, if there is insufficient evidence regarding the divisibility of a harm, 
the harm is treated as an indivisible harm.  Id. 
 58. Provided, of course, that there was no further way to divide the torso’s harms into discrete 
items. 
 59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 26 cmt. c (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000) (explaining that the “two-step” process for causal and fault apportionment only 
authorizes fault-based apportionment for indivisible harms).  We note here that we use the term 
“comparative fault” to refer to “comparative negligence,” since comparative negligence—that is, 
unreasonable plaintiff conduct—is the type of plaintiff conduct that implicates liability 
apportionment between the plaintiff and defendants for the purposes of § 26.  Note that some courts, 
many of which are quoted throughout this article, use “comparative responsibility” to mean 
comparative fault and comparative negligence.  Typically, “comparative responsibility” refers to all 
tortious conduct, including strict liability, rather than just negligence.  See id. at § 1. 
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not identical) to the cases employing avoidable consequences.60  In this 
hypothetical, a cook aboard a boat negligently starts an uncontrollable grease 
fire while cooking at sea.  Attempting to save the boat, the cook races to the 
cockpit and steers the boat toward the dock to enable firefighters to put out 
the fire and save the ship.  The cook succeeds in reaching the dock, and 
firefighters begin to douse the flames.  Unfortunately, the dock owner 
believes the burning boat will destroy her dock and unreasonably casts the 
boat off by releasing the line tethering it to the dock.  Due to having smoke-
choked engines, the boat is adrift and unable to maneuver.  The boat’s crew 
evacuates, and the boat burns to a cinder.  Before being cast adrift, the boat 
had severe cosmetic and engine damage (amounting to, say, $100,000), but 
the boat would have been saved if the dock owner had not unreasonably cast 
the boat adrift.  In a suit against the dock owner for damages to the boat, how 
should damages be apportioned?  
First, each indivisible harm suffered by the ship owner, as well as the 
parties responsible for each of those harms, must be identified.61  Why must 
the court begin by identifying the discrete harms that occurred?  As stated 
above, tortfeasors pay only for harm that they caused.  If there is a discrete 
harm—and there are two in this hypothetical—then we must distinguish them 
and apportion liability for each harm separately unless all parties caused each 
discrete harm.62  That is not the case here, as only one party—the cook—is 
responsible for the cosmetic and engine damage.  The cook’s negligence is 
the only relevant cause of the fire, and the fire alone caused the $100,000 of 
cosmetic and engine damage regardless of the dock owner’s subsequent 
conduct.  Thus, the cook—for whom the boat’s owner is vicariously liable—
is solely responsible for the $100,000 of cosmetic and engine damage.  
 
 60. We draw on Protectus Alpha Navigation Co. v. North Pacific Grain Growers, Inc., 767 F.2d 
1379, 1381 (9th Cir. 1985), for the hypothetical in the text.  We have slightly modified the facts to 
better serve our illustrative purpose. 
 61. We suspect that a number of judges fail to appreciate this step, as did the trial judge in 
Greenwood v. Mitchell, 621 N.W.2d 200, 204 (Iowa 2001).  In this case, the defendant drove into 
the plaintiff, a pedestrian, and injured his shoulder.  Id. at 201.  The defendant argued that the 
plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages by not attending physical rehabilitation, thereby enhancing 
the initial injury.  Id. at 202. The trial judge did not instruct the jury to causally apportion the initial 
and enhanced harm, so, when the jury found the plaintiff 60% at fault, the judge entered judgment 
for the defendant based on the state’s modified comparative fault scheme.  Id. at 204.  It is important 
to note that some courts and commentators justify the traditional application of avoidable 
consequences based on concerns that the trial court’s approach in Greenwood would result in 
barring recovery routinely in modified comparative fault jurisdictions.  As explained in this Part 
and in Part III.E, such a justification misunderstands causal apportionment. 
 62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 26 cmt. c Reporters’ 
Notes (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (explaining that, if all the parties contributed to the harm and it is 
impossible to divide the harm into indivisible components due to lack of evidence, then the “two-
step” process becomes a “one-step” process,” and the factfinder can apportion fault between all 
those responsible). 
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The second harm—the boat’s value less the $100,000 of cosmetic and 
engine damage; that is, the enhanced harm that occurred after the initial 
damage—resulted from both the cook’s negligence and the dock owner’s 
unreasonable conduct.63  Moreover, this second harm is indivisible because 
it cannot be further factually apportioned—both the cook and the dock owner 
caused the entirety of this harm.64  Thus, proceeding to the second step of the 
apportionment process, the factfinder will have to apportion damages for this 
second, enhanced harm between the cook and the dock owner by assigning 
comparative percentages of fault.65   
In sum, factfinders assign shares of comparative responsibility among 
parties for each indivisible harm suffered by a plaintiff.66  Such comparative 
responsibility is assigned based on the tortious conduct that caused that 
indivisible harm.  As such, the comparative responsibility assigned to one 
party (say, to the plaintiff) may be different for each indivisible harm suffered 
by the plaintiff because (1) the negligent conduct that caused each indivisible 
harm may be different or (2) a different set of parties may be responsible for 
different indivisible harms.67  Thus, factfinders assign different responsibility 
shares for each indivisible harm if the facts warrant such treatment.68  
B. Enhanced Harms Are Common in Tort Law and Are Routinely 
Apportioned Under the Principles Set Forth Above 
Enhanced injury cases—cases in which a subsequent event enhances the 
plaintiff’s initial injury—occur with some frequency in tort law.  In such 
 
 63. See id. § 26 cmt. f Reporters’ Notes (“Divisible damages may occur when a part of the 
damages was caused by one set of persons in an initial accident and was then later enhanced by a 
different set of persons.”). 
 64. Id. § 26 cmt. g. 
 65. The factors involved in apportioning responsibility for indivisible harms is beyond the 
scope of this article, although factfinders often apportion by considering the culpability of the risk-
creating conduct of each party and the strength of the proximate causal connection between that 
conduct and the resulting harm.  Id.  § 26 cmt. c Reporters’ Note. 
 66. Id. § 26. 
 67. To illustrate, consider the following hypothetical: A negligently parks his automobile in a 
dangerous location.  B negligently crashes his automobile into A’s automobile, damaging it.  When 
B is standing in the road inspecting the damage, B is hit by C, causing personal injury to B.  B sues 
A and C for personal injury and property damage.  B’s negligent driving and A’s negligent parking 
caused damage to B’s automobile.  A’s negligent parking, B’s negligent driving, B’s negligent 
standing in the road, and C’s negligent driving caused B’s personal injuries.  The factfinder 
determines damages separately for B’s automobile and B’s person.  The factfinder assigns separate 
percentages of responsibility to A and B for damage to B’s automobile, considering A’s parking and 
B’s driving.  A’s and B’s percentages add to 100 percent.  The factfinder assigns a separate 
percentage of responsibility to A, B, and C for B’s personal injury, considering A’s parking, B’s 
driving, B’s standing in the road, and C’s driving.  A’s, B’s, and C’s percentages add to 100 percent. 
Id. cmt. c, illus. 1. 
 68. Id.  
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cases, courts routinely recognize that the plaintiff’s enhanced harm is an 
indivisible injury and instruct factfinders to apportion that harm separately 
and based on party fault, rather than apportioning the enhanced harm entirely 
to one party.69 
Consider the products liability crashworthiness doctrine, employed in 
so-called “second impact” cases.70  For convenience, let us assume the 
plaintiff is the only cause of his or her initial automobile accident,71 due to, 
say, intoxicated driving or otherwise negligent conduct.72  As such, the 
plaintiff is wholly responsible for his or her initial harm.73  However, due to 
a defect in the plaintiff’s vehicle, the plaintiff suffers a “second collision” 
that enhances the initial injury.74  Seeking remedy, a crashworthiness plaintiff 
sues the vehicle manufacturer for the damages associated with the enhanced 
harm—i.e., those harms that occur as a result of the “second collision.”75  In 
these cases, the enhanced harm is indivisible because, again, it was a discrete 
 
 69. E.g., Miyamoto v. Lum, 84 P.3d 509, 521 (Haw. 2004) (plaintiff suffered enhanced harm 
due to the treating chiropractor’s malpractice); Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1164 
(Cal. 1978) (plaintiff suffered an enhanced injury due to defendant manufacturer’s design defect).  
Serial automobile accidents in which the plaintiff suffers aggravation of a harm that occurred in a 
prior collision is another example.  See Loui v. Oakley, 438 P.2d 393, 395 (Haw. 1968) (plaintiff 
was involved in a series of four automobile accidents, each resulting in injury to the same area of 
her body, for which the court required causal apportionment in a suit against the defendant 
responsible for the first accident).  Another instance of enhanced harm occurs when the plaintiff 
suffers from an adverse physical condition and the defendant causes an aggravation of the harm.  
Again, courts appreciate that the defendant is liable only for the enhanced harm because the 
defendant did not cause the original condition.  See Montalvo v. Lapez, 884 P.2d 345, 362 (Haw. 
1994) (plaintiff with prior back and neck injuries suffered enhanced injury in a multi-vehicle 
accident). 
 70. E.g., Daly, 575 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Cal. 1978) (“[T]he case involves a so-called ‘second 
collision’ in which the ‘defect’ did not contribute to the original impact, but only to the 
‘enhancement’ of injury.”). 
 71. This assumption is not necessary.  The same principles of apportionment would apply if 
another driver negligently caused the accident or the negligence of the other driver and the plaintiff 
concurred to cause the accident.  Those changes in the facts would change the fault apportionment 
but not the critical causal apportionment explained below. 
 72. See Daly, 575 P.2d at 1164 (intoxicated motorist drove at 50–70 miles per hour into a metal 
divider fence); Dannenfelser v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 370 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1093 (D. Haw. 2005) 
(plaintiff negligently crossed the median and crashed into a lamp post after drinking four alcoholic 
beverages and consuming marijuana before driving); Whitehead v. Toyota Motor Corp., 897 
S.W.2d 684, 685 (Tenn. 1995) (plaintiff negligently crossed the center line and collided head-on 
with incoming traffic). 
 73. Typically, these second collisions result from ejection.  For instance, in Daly v. General 
Motors Corp., the plaintiff negligently drove into a metal fence and suffered injuries from the 
impact. After hitting the fence, the plaintiff’s vehicle began spinning, the “driver’s door was thrown 
open, and [the plaintiff] was forcibly ejected from the car and sustained fatal head injuries.”  Id. at 
1164.  The court found that “the ‘defect’ did not contribute to the original impact and injury, but 
only to the ‘enhancement’ of injury.”).  Id.  
 74. Id.  
 75. See, e.g., id. 
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harm caused by both by the plaintiff and the defendant manufacturer (and/or 
a third party whose negligence caused the initial accident).76  Accordingly, 
the factfinder apportions comparative responsibility for the enhanced harm 
between the plaintiff and the automobile manufacturer.77  This apportionment 
method reflects the fundamental apportionment principles explained in Part 
II.A.  
“Secondary-harm” cases are another example of cases involving 
enhanced harms.  These cases involve a plaintiff injured by the tortious 
conduct of another whose harm is enhanced by physician malpractice.78  The 
secondary harm is indivisible because it is a discrete harm caused by the 
conduct of multiple parties.79  Under these circumstances, courts require the 
factfinder to apportion the secondary harm among its tortious causes—i.e., 
the initial tortfeasor and the physician third party.80  To be sure, the enhanced 
harms in these cases were not caused by negligent plaintiff conduct.  But, 
whether plaintiff or defendant, special rules that applied to plaintiff conduct 
were among the casualties of comparative fault’s widespread adoption.81  As 
such, in avoidable consequences cases, courts should allow factfinders to 
apportion enhanced harm based on the comparative fault of the parties—as 
courts do in the enhanced-harm cases just discussed—rather than bar 
plaintiffs from recovering for their enhanced harms. 
 
 76. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 26 cmt. g (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000). 
 77. See Daly, 575 P.2d at 1171–72 (holding that comparative fault applies to the enhanced harm 
in crashworthiness cases); Dannenfelser, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 1095 (same); Whitehead, 897 S.W.2d 
at 693 (same); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1998).  
 78. See, e.g., Miyamoto v. Lum, 84 P.3d 509, 521–22 (Haw. 2004) (addressing liability of 
chiropractor whose negligence aggravated plaintiff’s initial injury caused by a negligent driver). 
 79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 26 cmt. g (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000). 
 80. See Miyamoto, 84 P.3d at 522 (“[A] defendant can be held liable for injuries resulting from 
both negligent and non-negligent medical treatment [that enhances the plaintiff’s harm].”); Pridham 
v. Cash & Carry Building Ctr., Inc., 359 A.2d 193, 197–98 (N.H. 1976) (“If the [medical] services 
are rendered negligently . . . the negligence of the original tortfeasor [is] a proximate cause of the 
subsequent injuries suffered by the victim.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY 
FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 35 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“An actor whose tortious 
conduct is a factual cause of harm to another is subject to liability for any enhanced harm the other 
suffers due to the efforts of third persons to render aid reasonably required by the other’s injury, so 
long as the enhanced harm arises from a risk that inheres in the effort to render aid.”). 
 81. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 3 cmt. a (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000) (“[S]pecial provisions in the Restatement Second of Torts for evaluating a plaintiff’s 
conduct are now superfluous and no longer effective [given the advent of comparative fault].”). 
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 Drivers who are in multiple car accidents may suffer enhanced harm to 
a previously suffered harm due to a subsequent accident.82 This is another 
common form of enhanced harm that requires the two-step apportionment 
described above. 
PART III: RECOGNIZING AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES AS A FORM OF 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND RESCUING THE DOCTRINE FROM 
THE CLUTCHES OF REMEDIES 
When one appreciates that there are two harms to apportion in the 
enhanced-harm cases discussed above, the case for apportioning the entirety 
of the enhanced harm on only the most proximate negligent party is weak.83  
Yet, that is precisely what avoidable consequences does.84  In that respect, 
avoidable consequences violates the apportionment principles set forth in 
Part II and the fundamental fairness that comparative fault provided.  Why 
does this happen?  There are several reasons, we believe. 
First, courts do not appreciate that avoidable consequences is merely a 
stylized version of enhanced harm and are instead captive to the idea that 
avoidable consequences is a remedial doctrine.85  Second, and relatedly, 
courts do not understand that barring recovery for avoidable consequences 
 
82 In Loui v. Oakley, 438 P.2d 393, 395 (Haw. 1968), the plaintiff was in four separate 
accidents and suffered harm to the same area of her body in each one, requiring the 
court to address how to apportion her harm based on causation. 
 83. This statement is subject to a fact-specific qualification based on scope of liability that we 
explain infra.  See infra notes 130–132 and accompanying text. 
 84. As an example, the Arkansas Supreme Court approved the following jury instruction 
regarding avoidable consequences: 
You are instructed, that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to use reasonable care to 
avoid unnecessary aggravation of his injuries; and if you believe from the evidence, that 
the plaintiff did not use reasonable care in following the advice of his physician, and if 
you further believe from the evidence that because of his failure to observe such 
reasonable care, his collar-bone was deformed, then the court tells you that the plaintiff 
cannot recover in this action for such deformity.  
Burnett v. Seventh St. Produce Co., 47 S.W.2d 38, 39 (Ark. 1932).  This instruction is quite typical.  
See, e.g., Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions, CACI No. 3930 (Nov. 2019), 
https://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/Judicial_Council_of_California_Civil_Jury_Instru
ctions.pdf; Connecticut Judicial Branch Civil Jury Instructions, ST. CONN. JUD. BRANCH § 4.5-14 
(Mar. 25, 2011), https://jud.ct.gov/JI/Civil/Civil.pdf; 66.015 Tort Damages; Duty to Lessen, GA. 
SUGGESTED PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (2020), https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/ 
I3c169813950d11dd93e7a76b30106ace/View/FullText.html?originationContext=document&cont
extData=(sc.Category)&transitionType=StatuteNavigator&needToInjectTerms=False; Hawai’i 
Civil Jury Instructions, HAW. ST. JUDICIARY, Instruction No. 18 (Mar. 7, 2016), 
https://www.courts.state.hi.us/docs/legal_references/jury_instructions_civil.pdf. 
 85. See infra notes 96–102 and accompanying text.  
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mirrors contributory negligence86 and thereby contravenes post comparative-
fault apportionment principles.87 
Third, some courts employing avoidable consequences fail to appreciate 
the appropriate causal inquiry in tort law, which asks who caused the 
plaintiff’s harm, rather than who caused the accident.88  Tort law 
compensates for harm, not for accidents;89 an accident that results in no 
legally compensable harm is not one in which tort law has an interest.  Fourth, 
some courts’ doctrinal analysis of avoidable consequences reveals confusion 
regarding fundamental apportionment principles in the comparative fault era: 
a plaintiff’s post-injury negligence is not a superseding cause of the enhanced 
harm because, save for highly unusual situations, the subsequent tortious 
conduct of a party does not absolve earlier tortfeasors of liability, especially 
when the plaintiff is the subsequent negligent party.90  Fifth, courts that 
apportion liability in mitigation of damages cases but bar recovery in 
avoidable consequences cases typically fail to recognize that the temporal 
distinction between avoidable consequences and mitigation of damages 
cannot justify treating the two doctrines differently.91  Finally, courts that 
maintain avoidable consequences because they are concerned that employing 
comparative fault could bar all recovery in modified comparative fault 
schemes misunderstand the apportionment principles set forth in Part II.92 
A. Avoidable Consequences Mirrors Contributory Negligence in 
Contravention of Comparative Fault Precepts 
Avoidable consequences employs the same apportionment method as 
contributory negligence, which bars plaintiffs from recovery if they 
unreasonably contributed to their harm.  Although avoidable consequences 
only bars a plaintiff from recovering for his or her enhanced harm rather than 
 
 86. Adar, supra note 21, at 799 (“[B]oth contributory negligence and mitigation of damages 
apply the same basic rule: Defendant is not liable for any damage caused by his wrongful conduct, 
if the plaintiff could and should have avoided suffering that damage.”) (emphasis omitted).  For 
further explanation, see infra Part III.A.  
 87. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 7 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000) (explaining that a plaintiff’s contributory negligence should not bar the plaintiff from 
recovery but instead reduce the plaintiff’s damages in proportion to the plaintiff’s comparative 
fault).  
 88. See infra note 106.  
 89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 
(AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“Tortious conduct must be a . . . cause of harm for liability to be imposed.”) 
(emphasis added).  To be sure, in routine cases without enhanced harm, the harm and the accident 
may concur. 
 90. See infra Part III.C. 
 91. See infra Part III.D. 
 92. See infra Part III.E. 
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barring the entire suit, the test for contributory negligence and avoidable 
consequences is the same: if the plaintiff deviates from the conduct of a 
reasonably prudent person and that deviation causally contributed to the 
plaintiff’s enhanced harm, the plaintiff bears the entirety of his or her 
enhanced-harm damages, even though the tortfeasor also caused the 
plaintiff’s enhanced harm.  Thus, both of these doctrines bar plaintiff 
recovery if the plaintiff’s negligence also caused the enhanced harm.  
That avoidable consequences duplicated contributory negligence’s rule 
and barred recovery for enhanced harms did not matter during the 
contributory negligence era—both would bar recovery for the enhanced 
harm, albeit under different doctrinal labels.93  But carrying avoidable 
consequences forward in a day when comparative fault has displaced 
contributory negligence is at odds with the apportionment framework 
required by comparative fault94 and retains the same unfairness that 
comparative fault was meant to displace.  Unreasonable plaintiff conduct no 
longer operates as a bar to recovery.95  As with the numerous tort doctrines 
identified in Part I that required reconsideration and modification after the 
adoption of comparative fault, so too does avoidable consequences.  Thus, 
courts should structure apportionment—for enhanced harms or otherwise—
in accordance with causation and party fault rather than leaving all enhanced-
harm damages to be borne by the plaintiff in avoidable consequences cases, 
 
 93. MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES TEACHER’S MANUAL 461–64 
(10th ed. 2016) (“Historically, courts barred any recovery for the enhanced harm that could have 
been avoided if the plaintiff had acted reasonably to mitigate the harm.  In a day of contributory 
negligence, that result made sense.  Today, if courts employ comparative fault principles, then the 
enhanced harm will be apportioned between the plaintiff and defendant in accordance with the 
comparative fault assigned to each.”). 
 94. See, e.g., id.; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506 (no longer barring plaintiff recovery if the 
plaintiff’s unreasonable conduct contributed to his or her harm); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122  
(same); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (same); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572H (same); FLA. STAT. § 
768.81 (same); IOWA CODE § 668.1  (defining “unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate 
damages” as fault); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1411 (same); see also, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 
1226, 1243–44 (Cal. 1975) (holding that a plaintiff’s contributory negligence “shall not bar 
recovery, but the damages award shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of [the plaintiff’s] 
negligence”). 
 95. The statement in the text is subject to qualification in modified comparative fault 
jurisdictions, which retain the complete bar of contributory negligence when the plaintiff’s fault 
exceeds a specified threshold, typically 50%.  E.g., IND. CODE § 34-51-2-7 (“If the percentage of 
fault of the claimant is greater than fifty percent (50%) of the total fault involved in the incident 
which caused the claimant’s . . . damage, the jury shall return a verdict for the defendant and no 
further deliberation of the jury is required.”).  Where the plaintiff’s fault would bar recovery for an 
enhanced harm, it would do so only because the factfinder apportioned comparative fault to the 
plaintiff and defendant(s) for the enhanced harm, and the factfinder apportioned fault to the plaintiff 
that exceeded the jurisdiction’s threshold.  
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especially because the defendant and the plaintiff both negligently caused the 
enhanced harm. 
Historically, remedies scholars—and other avoidable consequences 
apologists—have argued that avoidable consequences and contributory 
negligence/comparative responsibility are unrelated doctrines because the 
former merely adjusts plaintiff recovery while the latter determines party 
liability.96  Indeed, it is this very reasoning that has likely prevented courts 
from appreciating the impact of comparative fault on avoidable consequences 
and exploring their interplay.97  This reasoning falls flat, however, because it 
fails to appreciate that avoidable consequences operates identically to 
contributory negligence for plaintiffs’ enhanced harms.  With this 
appreciation, one can readily see that avoidable consequences is no more a 
remedial matter than is contributory or comparative negligence.98  Clearing 
this unfortunate taxonomic underbrush would greatly contribute to clearer 
and more coherent analyses regarding the interactions between comparative 
fault and avoidable consequences.  
 
 96. E.g., Ostrowski v. Azzara, 545 A.2d 148, 154–55 & n.5 (N.J. 1988) (explaining that 
“[c]omparative negligence is generally ‘viewed as a liability doctrine, rather than a damage 
doctrine’” and that avoidable consequences “should more properly be addressed to the question of 
diminution of damages; it does not go to the existence of a cause of action.”); Pennzoil Producing 
Co. v. Offshore Exp., Inc., 943 F.2d 1465, 1474 (5th Cir. 1991) (explaining that “the doctrine 
of avoidable consequences is really a rule of damages, and that as such it stands wholly apart from 
the rules that determine who is at fault for the initial injury.”); Adar, supra note 21, at 798 
(“[W]hereas contributory negligence is treated as a complete defense to liability in tort, mitigation 
is considered a remedial rule, which affects merely the scope of the plaintiff’s recovery.”).  The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts promoted this distinction, explaining that “contributory negligence 
either precludes recovery or is no defense at all to a claim for compensatory damages. On the other 
hand, the rule [of avoidable consequences] stated in this Section applies only to the diminution of 
damages and not to the existence of a cause of action.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1979).  As Professor Adar explains, “[t]his is an entrenched distinction.”  
Adar, supra note 21, at 798 n.54.  
 97. HARPER ET AL., supra note 33, at 604 (explaining that courts continue to employ avoidable 
consequences as a recovery bar due to “unthinking treatment of [avoidable consequences] as a rule 
entirely separate from the principle of contributory negligence”); Adar, supra note 21, at 795–96 
(explaining that the division between comparative fault and avoidable consequences, a remedies 
doctrine, is “so entrenched that it sometimes leads remedies experts to exclude any treatment of 
comparative negligence from their textbooks, presumably on the basis of the assumption that the 
doctrine [of comparative fault] involves issues of liability rather than remedial questions.”).   
 98. This is a matter that seems to escape remedies scholars.  See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK & 
RICHARD L. HAZEN, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES & MATERIALS 86–93 (5th ed. 2018) 
(addressing avoidable consequences as a matter limiting damages but containing no coverage of 
contributory or comparative negligence); DOUG RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, REMEDIES: 
CASES & MATERIALS 139–53 (8th ed. 2010) (same); RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL., REMEDIES: A 
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 736–57 (5th ed. 2019) (explaining, in the course of discussing 
avoidable consequences, why comparative fault is different). 
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One commenter previously made precisely this point, i.e., that the 
remedy/liability distinction between avoidable consequences and 
contributory negligence is artificial, explaining:  
[C]ontrary to its widespread image as a rule that merely reduces 
recovery for avoidable losses, [avoidable consequences] in fact 
eliminates altogether the right of a plaintiff to recover for any such 
losses, even when they are factually linked to the defendant’s 
wrongful conduct.  In this very important respect, the [avoidable 
consequences] doctrine is identical to the doctrine of contributory 
negligence: both have the effect of completely barring the plaintiff 
from recovering any damages whatsoever, if those damages could 
have been avoided by the exercise of due care.  Put differently, 
contributory negligence and [avoidable consequences] are two 
parallel but identical doctrines of tort law: they lay down the same 
substantive principle . . . .99 
To be blunt, the remedy/liability distinction between avoidable 
consequences and comparative fault is untenable.  Indeed, Dean Prosser 
wrote that “the doctrines of contributory negligence and avoidable 
consequences are in reality the same,”100 and Professor McCormick 
suggested that any distinction between the two doctrines is “using different 
labels for two sides of the same bottle.”101  As explained above in Part II.A, 
comparative fault employs a more granular and equitable distribution of 
damages in relation to causation and party fault, as should avoidable 
consequences.102  The all-or-nothing allocation of damages to the plaintiff 
under avoidable consequences thus violates the fairness concerns that 
animated the adoption of comparative fault principles.  
B. Confusion About What Must Be Apportioned: The Harm or the 
Accident? 
Some courts that employ avoidable consequences as a bar to recovery 
for enhanced harm fumble the causal inquiry, focusing on the causes of the 
accident instead of the causes of the plaintiff’s harms.103  Other courts make 
 
 99. Adar, supra note 21, at 801; see also Jerry J. Phillips, The Case for Judicial Adoption of 
Comparative Fault in South Carolina, 32 S.C. L. REV. 295, 311 (1980) (“Under any analysis, 
contributory negligence and avoidable consequences cannot be distinguished in logic or in policy.”). 
 100. WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW ON TORTS § 65, at 423 (4th ed. 1971).  
 101. Id. (quoting CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW ON DAMAGES § 33, at 129 
(1935)). 
 102. See supra Part II.A. 
 103. See, e.g., Kocher v. Getz, 824 N.E.2d 671, 674 (Ind. 2005) (explaining that enhanced harms 
should not be apportioned under comparative fault because the plaintiff’s subsequent conduct did 
not cause the initial accident).  But see Cox v. Lesko, 953 P.2d 1033, 1039 (Kan. 1998) (observing 
that although defendant-doctors may have committed malpractice in the treatment of the plaintiff’s 
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a related but different error in failing to appreciate that avoidable 
consequences implicates a second harm that requires its own 
apportionment.104  As explained in Part II, tort law concerns itself with 
determining the causes of the plaintiff’s harm.105  This is an important 
distinction that courts miss, incorrectly reasoning that comparative fault 
principles cannot apply in avoidable consequences cases because the 
plaintiff’s after-injury conduct did not causally contribute to the initial 
accident.106  
To recognize the importance of this distinction, consider a helmetless 
motorcyclist who suffers body bruises and a severe concussion in a collision 
negligently caused by the defendant.107  Assume that the concussion would 
not have occurred if the motorcyclist had been wearing a helmet.  The 
plaintiff’s failure to wear a helmet did not cause the collision itself; the 
 
shoulder “these acts may not have resulted in any injury or damages if [the patient’s] shoulder had 
proceeded to heal.”). 
 104. See, e.g., Preston v. Keith, 584 A.2d 439, 445 (Conn. 1991) (permitting comparative fault 
apportionment of the initial injury but not the enhanced harm because the court failed to appreciate 
that comparative fault requires each indivisible harm to be apportioned in accordance with party 
fault, not just the initial injury); Tedd Bish Farm, Inc. v. Sw. Fencing Servs., LLC, 867 N.W.2d 265, 
271–72 (Neb. 2015) (same). 
 105. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 
(AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“Tortious conduct must be a . . . cause of harm for liability to be imposed.”) 
(emphasis added); see also supra Part II. 
 106. E.g., Law v. Superior Ct. In & For Maricopa Cty., 755 P.2d 1135, 1138 (Ariz. 1988) 
(explaining that “[b]ecause [plaintiff negligence in enhancing harm] seldom contributes to the 
occurrence of the accident,” it does not easily allow for liability apportionment, focusing on the 
causes of the accident rather than the causes of the harm); Waterson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 544 A.2d 
357, 359 (N.J. 1988) (“Thus the principle we announce does not concern a plaintiff’s fault in causing 
an automobile accident and, accordingly, does not rest on this state’s comparative negligence law.”); 
Melesko v. Riley, 339 A.2d 479, 479 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1975) (“The [negligence] of the plaintiff . . . 
could not, as a matter of law, have caused the accident . . . .”); Kocher v. Getz, 824 N.E.2d 671, 675 
(Ind. 2005) (“[A] plaintiff’s post-accident conduct that constitutes an unreasonable failure to 
mitigate damages is not to be considered in the assessment of fault . . . .”); Komlodi v. Picciano, 89 
A.3d 1234, 1248 (N.J. 2014) (reflecting the belief that comparative fault can be used only to 
apportion for injuries caused in the initial accident); DOBBS ET AL., supra note 33, at § 16.10 
(“Under this rule [avoidable consequences], the plaintiff who fails to [act reasonably in mitigating 
the injury] is not chargeable with comparative negligence, because failure to use a seatbelt did not 
cause the accident.”). See also Nonuse of Seatbelt as Reducing Amount of Damages Recoverable, 
62 A.L.R.5th 537 (1998 & Supp.); Motorcyclist’s Failure to Wear Helmet or Other Protective 
Equipment as Affecting Recovery for Personal Injury or Death, 85 A.L.R.4th 365 (1991 & Supp.).  
Although most of the citations in this footnote discuss mitigation of damages, i.e., the use of 
seatbelts or motorcycle helmets, the focus on the plaintiff’s conduct not causing the accident or 
initial harm exists in avoidable consequences as well.  See Kocher, 824 N.E.2d at 675 (refusing to 
consider aggravated lost wages under comparative fault because the plaintiff’s post-accident 
conduct did not cause the initial injuries).  
 107. The facts of this illustration are borrowed from Nabors Well Servs., Ltd. v. Romero, 456 
S.W.3d 553, 555–58 (Tex. 2015).  See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT 
OF LIABILITY § 3 cmt. b, illus. 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
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accident would have occurred regardless of whether the plaintiff was wearing 
a helmet.  That said, the plaintiff’s failure to wear a helmet certainly 
contributed to the plaintiff’s concussion, i.e., the plaintiff’s enhanced harm 
due to not wearing a helmet.  Examining the causes of accidents rather than 
the causes of each harm misses the fundamental principle requiring 
apportionment first on the causes of the plaintiff’s harm or harms.108 
In Kocher v. Getz,109 the Indiana Supreme Court confronted 
comparative fault’s impact on avoidable consequences.  In that case, the 
defendant was the only cause of an automobile collision with the plaintiff.110  
Among the damages the plaintiff sought to recover were her lost wages.  In 
response, the defendant argued that the plaintiff was negligent in failing to 
secure alternative employment and therefore failed to mitigate her lost wage 
damages.111  The trial court submitted the defendant’s avoidable 
consequences defense, and the jury found for the defendant on the matter, 
thus barring the plaintiff from recovering for her lost wages.112  On appeal, 
the Indiana Supreme Court limited the application of comparative fault only 
to the causes of the initial accident.113  This limitation removed any 
comparative fault apportionment for the plaintiff’s enhanced harm, namely 
her lost wages.114  In doing so, the court fumbled in its interpretation of 
Indiana’s comparative fault statute, whose plain language included 
“unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages” as an 
element of fault to be apportioned, along with other parties’ fault, among “all 
persons who caused or contributed to cause the alleged injury. . . .”115  
We emphasize that the comparative fault statute requires assessing each 
contributor’s comparative fault for the plaintiff’s injury; that is, the plaintiff’s 
harm.  After all, the definition for “physical harm” is  “the physical 
impairment of the human body.”116  As the discussion about enhanced harm 
in Part II reveals, a case may include more than one harm to the plaintiff, a 
matter the Kocher court failed to appreciate as it focused only on 
apportionment for the causes of the accident.117  In so doing, the court 
effectively interpreted “the fault of all persons who caused . . . the alleged 
 
 108. See supra Part II.A. 
 109. 824 N.E.2d 671 (Ind. 2005). 
 110. Id. at 673. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 673–74.  
 114. Id. at 675.  
 115. IND. CODE § 34-6-2-45(b) (2020) (emphasis added). 
 116.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 4 
(AM. LAW INST. 2010) 
 117. See Kocher, 824 N.E.2d at 673–75. 
  
404 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80:380 
 
injury”118 to mean “the fault of all persons who caused . . . the accident.”  
Since conduct must precede the accident to cause it, the court was left with a 
quandary, namely how to account for the plaintiff’s failure to mitigate.  
Without analysis, the court concluded that the plaintiff was barred from 
recovering those lost wages.  Indeed, later in the opinion, the court explained 
that enhanced harms should not be apportioned by comparative fault “if the 
act of the injured party does not operate in causing the injury from which all 
damages ensued, but merely adds to the resulting damages. . . .”119 
In this manner, the Indiana Supreme Court failed to recognize the 
principle that apportionment must proceed first based on identifying each 
indivisible harm suffered by the plaintiff.  Failing to do that, the court was 
left with the remedies mindset that a plaintiff’s failure to mitigate harm bars 
recovery for those damages that could have been avoided.  If the court had 
instead focused on the causes of each of the plaintiff’s harms, it would have 
been natural to apportion each of the plaintiff’s harms in accordance with 
party fault—as mandated by Indiana’s comparative fault statute120—rather 
than barring recovery for the enhanced harm in contravention of 
apportionment principles. 
Kocher illustrates that the failure to distinguish between the causes of 
the plaintiff’s harm and those of the accident can lead courts astray from an 
equitable apportionment of liability.  In addition, Kocher reveals the flaws 
that result from failing to appreciate that causal apportionment precedes 
comparative fault apportionment.  These flaws can be found in myriad 
avoidable consequences and mitigation of damages cases.121  Most of these 
courts are quite unaware of the deficiencies of this reasoning, however, and 
rule cursorily, simply citing precedent without conducting any analysis.122  
That said, other courts across the United States have recognized that 
apportionment must address the causes of a plaintiff’s harms rather than 
accidents.123  By attending to this distinction, it is clear that the plaintiff’s 
 
 118. Id. at 673 (citing IND. CODE §§ 34-51-2-7 to -8). 
 119. Id. at 674. 
 120. IND. CODE § 34-51-2-7(b)(1) (2020) (“In assessing percentage of fault, the jury shall 
consider the fault of all persons who caused or contributed to cause the alleged injury . . . .”). 
 121. See supra notes 104 & 106.  
 122. See, e.g., Anglin v. Kleeman, 665 A.2d 747, 752 (N.H. 1995) (routinely applying avoidable 
consequences without critical examination); Lublin v. Weber, 833 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Nev. 1992) 
(same); Walter, 748 A. 2d at 970 (same).  For additional cases that employ avoidable consequences 
precedent without examination, see supra note 27. 
 123. E.g., Nabors Well Servs., Ltd. v. Romero, 456 S.W.3d 553, 562 (Tex. 2015) 
(“Furthermore, [apportionment statutes] focus the fact-finder on assigning responsibility for the 
‘harm for which recovery of damages is sought’—two examples of which are ‘personal injury’ and 
‘death’—and not strictly for the underlying occurrence, such as a car accident.”); Campbell v. La. 
Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 648 So. 2d 898, 903 (La. 1995) (distinguishing between the causes of the 
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injury-enhancing conduct in Kocher (1) contributed to the plaintiff’s harm, if 
not the initial injury, and (2) should thus be considered when apportioning 
liability for that enhanced harm under comparative fault rather than barring 
recovery.  
C. Superseding124 Cause Justifications for Avoidable Consequences 
Fail to Account for Comparative Fault’s Impact on Superseding 
Cause 
Some courts justify avoidable consequences barring all recovery for 
plaintiff enhanced harm because “under the avoidable consequences rule for 
minimizing damages, the plaintiff is regarded as the sole proximate cause of 
damages suffered because she failed to mitigate damages once injury 
occurred.”125  This rationale is problematic for two reasons. First, “sole 
proximate cause” is not an explanation, it is a conclusion that obscures 
whatever analysis (or intuition) lies behind that conclusion.126  Second, a rule 
that an initial tortfeasor’s liability can be “cutoff,” as a matter of law, by the 
subsequent conduct of another ignores the impact of comparative fault on the 
superseding cause doctrine.127  
 
accident and the harm by noting that while the first defendant’s negligence “set the course for an 
accident to happen,” the second defendant’s negligence nevertheless contributed to the plaintiffs’ 
decedents’ harms despite not causing the accident); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Ameron Pole Prods. 
LLC, 257 Cal. Rptr. 3d 131, 138 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) (explaining that the causal inquiry in tort 
“focuses on the nexus between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s harm” and that “[t]he 
causation analysis does not require a nexus between the defendant’s conduct and the [initial] 
accident”); Geibel v. PennDOT, 8 Pa. D. & C.4th 302, 307 (Com. Pl. 1990) (“Therefore, our concern 
is not whether the plaintiff’s decedent’s conduct caused the initial accident, but whether 
it . . . caused the plaintiff’s decedent’s harm.”). 
 124. Courts use “superseding cause,” “supervening cause,” “intervening cause,” “sole proximate 
cause,” “intervening force,” and “intervening negligence” to mean approximately the same thing.  
See Terry Christlieb, Note, Why Superseding Cause Analysis Should be Abandoned, 72 TEX. L. 
REV. 161, 167–68 (1993) (discussing the confusing usage and overlapping definitions of these 
terms); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 34 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (discussing variable terminology for superseding cause).  
 125. Williams v. Manchester, 864 N.E.2d 963, 986 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (quoting DAN B. DOBBS 
ET AL., TORTS § 196, at 489 (2001)), vacated in part on other grounds, 888 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2008). 
See also, e.g., Weston v. Dun Transp., 695 S.E.2d 279, 282 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (“Under this 
doctrine, the plaintiff’s negligence in failing to avoid the consequences of the defendant’s 
negligence is deemed the sole proximate cause of the injuries sustained”); Hallas v. Boehmke & 
Dobosz, Inc., 686 A.2d 491, 497 (Conn. 1997) (“‘[T]he theoretical foundation for the plaintiff’s 
duty to mitigate damages is that the defendant’s negligence is not the proximate, or legal, cause of 
any damages that could have been avoided had the plaintiff taken reasonable steps to promote 
recovery and avoid aggravating the original injury.’”). 
 126. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 34 
cmt. a Reporters’ Note (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
 127. E.g., Everly v. Columbia Gas of W. Va., Inc., 301 S.E.2d 165, 168 (W. Va. 1982) (“[I]t is 
only necessary for a defendant’s negligence to be a contributing cause of the plaintiff’s injury, not 
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Before continuing with this critique of the superseding cause 
justification, we pause  briefly to discuss how scope of liability, or proximate 
cause, could properly operate in avoidable consequences cases.128  
Fundamentally, a defendant is not liable for a plaintiff’s harm unless that 
harm was within the defendant’s scope of liability.129  As such, in some 
avoidable consequences cases, as in other enhanced harm cases, the 
factfinder could absolve the defendant of liability for the plaintiff’s enhanced 
harm by determining that the plaintiff’s after-injury conduct that enhanced 
the harm was outside the defendant’s scope of liability.130  This, however, 
first requires appreciation that the plaintiff’s initial injury and enhanced 
injury are discrete harms, and then requires the jury131 to determine, based on 
the facts of the case, that the enhanced harm was not within the defendant’s 
scope of liability, a result that would be out of the ordinary based on how 
 
the sole proximate cause.”).  See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL 
AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 34 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2010); Green, supra note 5, at 1130 
(explaining that “when a plaintiff’s acts, however careless or unreasonable, are denominated a 
superseding cause, thereby barring recovery, the basic principle of comparative responsibility is 
substantially undetermined.”); Id. at 1135 (arguing that the “evolution in the legal treatment of 
causation” and an awareness of “the dual aspects of legal cause and the appropriate role of proximate 
cause” create “persuasive reasons to consign superseding cause to the same receptacle in which 
[courts and commentators] have placed contributory negligence.”); Paul T. Hayden, Butterfield 
Rides Again: Plaintiff’s Negligence as Superseding or Sole Proximate Cause in Systems of Pure 
Comparative Responsibility, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 887, 917 (2000) (noting that “[t]he most pointed 
criticism of the use of superseding or sole proximate cause . . . is that it undercuts the idea of pure 
comparative responsibility”); John G. Phillips, The Sole Proximate Cause “Defense”: A Misfit in 
the World of Contribution and Comparative Negligence, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 1–2 (1997) (explaining 
that “there may be more than one cause of an injury” and that “it is not a defense [in tort] that some 
other person or thing contributed to the injury.”); Christlieb, supra note 124, at 161–62 (explaining 
why “causal analyses can and should be simplified by abandoning . . . ‘superseding cause’—and the 
substitutes for it—in virtually all legal analysis.”); Christopher Dove, Note, Dumb As A Matter of 
Law: The “Superseding Cause” Modification of Comparative Negligence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 493, 
493–96 (2000) (explaining that comparative fault should control when the subsequent negligent 
conduct of the plaintiff or a third party contributes to the plaintiff’s harm, rather than the superseding 
cause doctrine). 
 128. Recall that superseding cause was typically viewed as a doctrine related to scope of 
liability/proximate cause.  FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 409–10; see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 34 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 
2010). 
 129. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 
(AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
 130. See Williams, 864 N.E.2d at 990 (“Thus, there can be little question that under well-
established proximate cause analysis the question of liability of the underlying tortfeasor for 
[enhanced harm caused by plaintiff’s refusal to undertake alternative treatment], at the very least, 
would remain an issue for a jury to determine and would not be susceptible to summary 
determination as a matter of law.”). 
 131. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 
cmt. f. (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“[S]cope of liability . . . is . . . a question of fact for the factfinder.”). 
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other enhanced harm cases are treated.132  Any such exoneration of a 
defendant for avoidable enhanced harm, however, should not be based on the 
notion that the plaintiff’s unreasonable conduct was a superseding cause of 
harm for the reasons explained below.  
When applied to a plaintiff’s conduct, a superseding cause—like 
contributory negligence133—absolves the defendant from liability despite the 
defendant’s role in causing the plaintiff’s harm.  Indeed, one commentator 
wrote that applying superseding cause to plaintiff conduct—an iteration of 
the superseding cause doctrine sometimes referred to as “sole proximate 
cause”134—amounts “to smuggling the abolished contributory negligence 
defense into . . . cases through the back door.”135  As a result, courts and 
commentators have long recognized that superseding cause and sole 
proximate cause applied to a plaintiff’s negligent conduct are not compatible 
with comparative fault, which apportions liability for the plaintiff’s harms 
among the responsible parties.136  Like avoidable consequences, it did not 
matter in the day of contributory negligence whether a plaintiff’s recovery 
was barred by contributory negligence, avoidable consequences, or 
superseding cause.  But, with comparative fault reform, doctrines instituting 
per se recovery bars must be reworked for the same reasons that courts and 
legislators reworked contributory negligence.137 
 
 132. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 35 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“An actor whose tortious conduct is a factual cause of harm to 
another is subject to liability for any enhanced harm the other suffers due to the efforts of third 
persons to render aid reasonably required by the other’s injury, so long as the enhanced harm arises 
from a risk that inheres in the effort to render aid.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY § 16 (AM. LAW INST. 1998) (addressing apportionment in crashworthiness cases). 
 133. One commentator argues that superseding cause, when applied to subsequent plaintiff 
conduct, is “another name for contributory negligence.”  Hayden, supra note 127, at 918. 
 134. See supra note 124.  
 135. Hayden, supra note 127, at 917–18.  
 136. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 34 
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2010). See also supra note 127. 
 137. For detailed discussions on the incompatibility of superseding cause and sole proximate 
cause with comparative fault, see Green, supra note 5; Hayden, supra note 127; Phillips, supra note 
127; Christlieb, supra note 124. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR 
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 34 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (containing an in-depth discussion 
in comments and reporters’ notes regarding comparative fault’s inconsistency with superseding 
cause and sole proximate cause); see also Adar, supra note 21, at 826 (addressing the 
incompatibility of employing superseding cause in avoidable consequences cases with comparative 
fault). 
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D. The Temporal Distinction Between Avoidable Consequences and 
Mitigation of Damages Fails to Justify Avoidable Consequences 
Operating as a Recovery Bar for Enhanced Harms 
We begin this Subpart with a stylized history of the incorporation of 
avoidable consequences and mitigation of harm into tort law.  Avoidable 
consequences has a longer history in tort law than mitigation of harm, which 
did not develop until the mid-twentieth century, largely in response to the 
introduction of seat belts.138  This history is in service of appreciating how 
mitigation of harm came to be recognized as plaintiff behavior that should be 
apportioned based on comparative fault, while avoidable consequences is 
treated differently by a large number of courts.  Finally, this Subpart explains 
why there is no good basis, according to the apportionment tools laid out in 
Part II, to distinguish these two doctrines. 
Avoidable consequences originated as a remedy for breach of 
contract.139  Thus, avoidable consequences developed in  the context of 
contract law’s strict liability for breach and prevented parties injured by 
breach from recovering avoidable losses.140  Contract law required a robust 
avoidable consequences doctrine because, for the most part, breach of 
contract results in only economic harm, and a plaintiff would have little or 
no incentive to mitigate that harm when damages are fully compensatory for 
that loss, a classic instance of moral hazard.  That, of course, is not the case 
when the harm is physical injury, where damages are not fully compensable 
and plaintiffs have (often powerful) incentives to obtain appropriate medical 
and other services to minimize their harm.141  In other words, there is more 
at stake in tort law than dollars and cents, and these stakes—such as avoiding 
physical discomfort, minimizing scarring, speeding recovery, and limiting 
long-term disability—provide significant motivation for plaintiffs to mitigate 
their injuries without avoidable consequences’ recovery bar.142  Moreover, it 
is important to appreciate a major difference between tort and  contract law; 
the latter—historically and today—has no mechanism for apportioning losses 
 
 138. See infra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 139. John C. Everett, Mitigation of Damages—Effect of Plaintiff Choosing Among Reasonable 
Alternatives, 23 ARK. L. REV. 132, 133 (1969) (“[T]he doctrine of [avoidable consequences] 
developed in the law of contracts.”). 
 140. Charles J. Goetz, The Mitigation Principle: Toward A General Theory of Contractual 
Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 967 n.1 (1983).  Functionally, this rule disincentivized economic 
waste among the parties to a contract.  See Michael B. Kelly, Living Without the Avoidable 
Consequences Doctrine in Contract Remedies, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 175, 246 (1996). 
 141. See Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE 
L.J. 697, 711–12 (1978) (explaining the variety of ways in which a physically injured plaintiff’s 
damages fall short of being fully compensatory). 
 142. See id. 
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between or among the parties, unlike contemporary tort law with comparative 
principles.143  Thus, in contrast to contract law, with comparative fault, a 
plaintiff still has the additional incentive to take reasonable mitigating steps 
because the plaintiff shares on the enhanced loss based on the jury’s 
assignment of comparative fault. 
In sum, tort law and contract law are different when it comes to, among 
other things, damages, incentives, and capacity.  Given these points of 
divergence, it makes sense for the two to diverge when it comes to who 
should bear responsibility for a plaintiff’s failure to mitigate. 
Before the middle of the nineteenth century, tort law had not taken shape 
as a coherent body of law.144  Although this history is contested, many cases 
under the English writ system145 were decided based on strict liability, similar 
to breach of contract.146  Given this history, the migration of avoidable 
consequences from contract into tort made sense, particularly since tort law, 
similar to contract law, had no apportionment mechanism.147  With the 
abolition of the writ system and the injuries of the Industrial Revolution 
fueling its growth,148 tort law largely moved away from strict liability and 
adopted fault as the basis for liability.149  As negligence became a basis for 
liability, the doctrine of contributory negligence rose as a defense.150  During 
the era of contributory negligence, any contributory plaintiff negligence 
would bar the plaintiff from recovery in tort.151 
Mitigation of damages152 evolved in the mid-twentieth century from 
avoidable consequences—when defendants began asserting the “seat belt 
 
 143. See, e.g., Haysville U.S.D. No. 261 v. GAF Corp., 666 P.2d 192, 199 (Kan. 1983) (“The 
use of the comparative negligence theory is not proper in breach of contract actions.”). 
 144. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 350 (3d ed. 2005) (“[T]he law of 
torts was totally insignificant before 1800, a twig on the great tree of law.”). 
 145. See Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A 
Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1723 (1981). 
 146. Id.; see also FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 35. 
 147. Emanuel G.D. van Dongen & Henriëtte P. Verdam, The Development of the Concept of 
Contributory Negligence in English Common Law, 12 UTRECHT L. REV. 61, 61–63 (2016) (tracking 
the early defenses in tort law before negligence became a basis for liability). 
 148. See FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 35. 
 149. Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292, 296 (1850), is an early prominent case explaining that 
defendants must be “in fault,” that is, “not using ordinary care” to be liable in tort.   
 150. Butterfield v. Forrester (1809) 103 Eng. Rep. 926; 11 East 60 is credited as the first case to 
adopt contributory negligence. Harrison v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 449 n.4; 
456 A.2d 894, 897 n.4 (1983) (explaining that “most modern courts and scholars agree with Dean 
Prosser in attributing the first recorded formulation of the [contributory negligence] doctrine to the 
Butterfield case.”) (citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 416 (4th ed. 1971)). 
 151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 152. As a reminder, we define mitigation of damages in this article to mean injury-enhancing 
plaintiff conduct that precedes or coincides with the initial injury but does not causally contribute 
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defense”153—despite mitigation of damages applying to plaintiff conduct that 
occurred before, rather than after, the accident.154  Failing to appreciate the 
necessity of causal apportionment, courts were concerned that employing 
contributory negligence in these seatbelt cases would bar all recovery.155  
 
to the accident itself.  Recall that courts and commenters often use avoidable consequences and 
mitigation of damages interchangeably.  See supra note 34. 
 153. Both Ford and Chrysler were offering seat belts as an option in the mid-1950s. AMERICAN 
SAFETY BELT COUNCIL, THE AUTOMOTIVE SEAT BELT STORY (1970).  For more information on 
the history and development of mitigation of harm and the impact of legislatures’ mandatory seat-
belt laws, see Robert M. Ackerman, The Seat Belt Defense Reconsidered: A Return to 
Accountability in Tort Law?, 16 N.M. L. REV. 221, 222-31 (1986). Mitigation of damages is not 
limited to seat-belt nonuse and would apply to any failure to use an available safety device. 
 154. For example, the New York Court of Appeals acknowledged that avoidable consequences 
typically applied to plaintiff conduct occurring after suffering an injury but nevertheless modified 
the doctrine to apply to pre-injury plaintiff conduct to avoid the application of contributory 
negligence: 
We concede that the opportunity to mitigate damages prior to the occurrence of 
an accident does not ordinarily arise, and that the chronological distinction, on which the 
concept of mitigation damages rests, is justified in most cases. However, in our opinion, 
the seat belt affords the automobile occupant an unusual and ordinarily unavailable means 
by which he or she may minimize his or her damages prior to the accident.  
Spier v. Barker, 323 N.E.2d 164, 168 (N.Y. 1974) (determining that mitigation of damages applies 
to a plaintiff’s failure to wear seatbelts after refusing to apply contributory negligence). To see the 
shifting narrative in seatbelt cases from contributory negligence to mitigation of damages, compare 
Automobile Occupant’s Failure to Use Seat Belt as Contributory Negligence, 92 A.L.R.3d 9 
(Originally published in 1979) (documenting how early court opinions responded to automobile 
plaintiffs who were not wearing seatbelts by anchoring their analysis around contributory 
negligence), with Nonuse of Seatbelt as Reducing Amount of Damages Recoverable, 62 A.L.R.5th 
537 (Originally published in 1998) (documenting how courts approached automobile plaintiffs who 
failed to wear seatbelts by anchoring their analyses largely around “principles of mitigation of 
damages”). 
 155. See, e.g., NCO Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Montgomery Park, LLC, 918 F.3d 388, 395 (4th Cir. 2019) 
(explaining that avoidable consequences “may decrease the amount of recoverable damages but 
does not necessarily preclude recovery of damages altogether.”); Garrett v. NationsBank, N.A., 491 
S.E.2d 158, 163 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (explaining that contributory negligence will “bar . . . the right 
of recovery” while avoidable consequences will reduce the amount of recovery); Southport Transit 
Co. v. Avondale Marine Ways, Inc., 234 F.2d 947, 949 n.2 (5th Cir. 1956) (“The harsh rule 
of . . . contributory negligence [which] wholly barred an injured person from recovery is completely 
incompatible with modern admiralty practice . . . admiralty has developed . . . its own fairer and 
more flexible rule which allows such consideration of contributory negligence in mitigation of 
damages as justice requires.”).  We would like to point out that this belief stems from courts failing 
to appreciate the necessity of causal apportionment.  A plaintiff’s contributory negligence should 
bar recovery only for the harm or harms to which that negligence contributed. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 467 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).  It seems that some courts, however, did not 
causally separate such items of harm.  This explains why some courts treated contributory 
negligence as generally barring the plaintiff’s “right of recovery.” Walter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
748 A.2d 961, 970 (Me. 2000) (explaining that, while avoidable consequences may affect the 
plaintiff’s recoverable damages, it does not bar the plaintiff’s “right of recovery”) (citing Isenman 
v. Burnell, 130 A. 868, 870 (Me. 1925) (distinguishing mitigation of damages and contributory 
negligence)).  This also explains why many courts insisted on keeping avoidable consequences and 
mitigation of damages distinct from contributory negligence.   
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Thus, some courts began to apply mitigation of damages to plaintiff 
misconduct that preceded or concurred with the accident but did not cause 
the accident, such as plaintiffs failing to wear seatbelts.  In this way, unbelted 
plaintiffs would not be barred by contributory negligence and could still 
maintain suits against tortfeasors in automobile collision cases, even if their 
recovery was diminished.  Other courts ruled that seatbelt nonuse could not 
sustain either contributory negligence or mitigation of damages, barring the 
introduction of such evidence.156 
To justify applying mitigation of damages in these collision cases 
instead of contributory negligence, which many courts believed would bar 
plaintiffs’ claims, some courts distinguished the two doctrines by explaining 
that contributory negligence only applied to plaintiff conduct that caused the 
initial accident, while mitigation of damages and avoidable consequences 
applied to injury-enhancing conduct that did not cause the initial accident.157  
Indeed, we believe that this reasoning may explain court confusion regarding 
the appropriate causal inquiry in avoidable consequences cases, discussed in 
Part III.B, since the doctrines of avoidable consequences and mitigation of 
damages are so incestuous.158  
Today, nearly every court has recognized that comparative fault governs 
pre-injury plaintiff negligence that enhances the plaintiff’s harm.159  Thus, 
the artificial reasoning that distinguished mitigation of damages from 
contributory negligence is no longer warranted.  Given that comparative fault 
has subsumed mitigation of damages, which is similarly classified as a 
remedies’ doctrine, what explains avoidable consequences’ different 
treatment? 
The justification for distinguishing avoidable consequences’ continued 
operation as a bar to recovery from mitigation of damages is that, after the 
defendant’s negligence has caused harm, the plaintiff has sole control over 
 
 156. See Carnation Co. v. Wong, 516 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. 1974), overruled by Nabors Well Servs., 
Ltd. v. Romero, 456 S.W.3d 553, 556 (Tex. 2015).  On the different treatment by courts with regard 
to seat-belt nonuse, see Law v. Superior Court In & For Maricopa Cty., 755 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Ariz. 
1988) (“The mitigation theory sharply split the courts.”).  
 157. See, Law, 755 P.2d at 1138 (“Because seat belt nonuse seldom contributes to the occurrence 
of the accident, it does not easily fit into the theory of contributory negligence.”); Waterson v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 544 A.2d 357, 359 (N.J. 1988) (“Thus the principle we announce does not concern a 
plaintiff’s fault in causing an automobile accident and, accordingly, does not rest on this state’s 
comparative negligence law.”); Melesko v. Riley, 339 A.2d 479, 479 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1975) 
(explaining that “[t]he failure of the plaintiff passenger to use a seat belt could not, as a matter of 
law, have caused the accident”); DOBBS ET AL., supra note 33, at § 16.10 (“Under this rule 
[mitigation of damages], the plaintiff who fails to use a safety device like a seatbelt is not chargeable 
with comparative negligence, because failure to use a seatbelt did not cause the accident.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 158. See supra note 34. 
 159. See supra note 36. 
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whether steps will be taken to mitigate the extent of or avoid that harm.160 
Only the plaintiff can seek medical attention, engage in physical 
rehabilitation, follow doctors’ orders, or take other appropriate steps to 
minimize the extent of the harm.  Of course, that is not true for plaintiff 
negligence that precedes or concurs with the defendant’s negligence.  Thus, 
the plaintiff’s sole agency over the magnitude of the loss after suffering the 
initial harm serves as the justification for placing responsibility solely on the 
plaintiff and distinguishing mitigation of harm, or so the claim goes.161   
This argument fails, we think, because it echoes the same reasoning that 
animated the last clear chance doctrine.  The last clear chance doctrine 
constituted an exception to contributory negligence when the plaintiff could 
show that the defendant had “the last clear chance”—after the plaintiff’s 
negligent conduct contributed to the plaintiff’s risk of harm—to avoid 
causing the plaintiff’s injury.162  After the plaintiff had negligently created 
risk to him- or herself, the defendant had the sole agency to avoid causing the 
harm, and so we see here complementary reasoning with avoidable 
consequences albeit with respect to the defendant’s, rather than the 
plaintiff’s, conduct.163  Critically, especially when considering that this 
rationale underlies avoidable consequences, last clear chance was universally 
abrogated after comparative fault’s adoption.164  With a tool available for 
apportioning damages, last clear chance’s all-or-nothing approach was 
rejected.  A defendant’s sole control over whether harm occurs is relevant to 
the extent of comparative responsibility assigned, but does not completely 
absolve the plaintiff for prior negligence that was also a cause of the harm.  
The same should be true for avoidable consequences: the jury can decide if 
 
 160. E.g., Piche v. Nugent, 436 F. Supp. 2d 193, 204 (D. Me. 2006) (explaining that comparative 
fault and plaintiff pre-accident negligence is temporally distinct from avoidable consequences, 
which only applies to plaintiff misconduct after the accident); see also 1 COMPARATIVE 
NEGLIGENCE MANUAL § 1:26 (3d ed. 2020). 
 161. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: REMEDIES § 7 cmt. c (Preliminary Draft No. 1 Oct. 
14, 2020) (“a salient fact is that [defendant] has absolutely no control over whether [plaintiff takes 
appropriate steps to minimize her harm]”). For a discussion of the interplay between avoidable 
consequences and instances when the plaintiff’s subsequent conduct is not within the plaintiff’s 
control, see Adar, supra note 21, at 828–39.   
 162. FRANKLIN, supra note 8, at 437. 
 163. Gary Schwartz explained the complementarity of last clear chance and avoidable 
consequences many decades ago.  See Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative 
Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697, 707 (1978). 
 164. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572h (“The legal doctrines of last clear chance and 
assumption of risk in actions to which this section is applicable are abolished.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 
31.600 (“The doctrine of last clear chance is abolished.”); MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (“The doctrine of 
last clear chance is abolished.”); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1242 (1975) (“[L]ast clear 
chance and assumption of risk . . . are to be subsumed under the general process of assessing 
liability in proportion to fault”). 
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the plaintiff’s sole agency over the enhanced harm justifies a larger 
assignment of comparative fault, but the defendant should still be held 
responsible for his or her contribution to that harm. 
Moreover, this “last opportunity” reasoning is inconsistent with the 
treatment of enhanced harm in other contexts.  Consider the tort doctrine of 
secondary harm, in which the enhanced harm caused by medical 
professionals occurs after the victim was injured and avoidance of further 
harm is solely in the hands of the medical professionals. 165  Despite this, 
courts employ comparative principles to apportion liability for the enhanced 
harm among all responsible parties.166  There is no good reason why 
avoidable consequences should be treated differently. 
Finally, as noted at the beginning of this Subpart, avoidable 
consequences initially developed in tort law that, at the time, lacked a device 
for apportioning liability, and was inherited from contract, which employed 
strict liability to an extent far greater than tort law.167  Given that 
apportionment in modern tort law substantially differs from that period, it 
makes sense that avoidable consequences should be reworked to cohere with 
modern apportionment principles.  
 
E. Explanations Relying on Avoidable Consequences Potentially 
Barring All Recovery if Subsumed by Comparative Fault in 
Modified Comparative Fault Jurisdictions Misunderstand Causal 
Apportionment 
Some courts and commentators have argued that subsuming avoidable 
consequences under comparative fault has the potential to cause greater 
injustice in modified comparative fault jurisdictions.168  According to this 
 
 165. See supra notes 78 & 79 and accompanying text. 
 166. See supra notes 80 & 81 and accompanying text. 
 167. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 168. E.g., Williams v. Jader Fuel Co., 944 F.2d 1388, 1402 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Under the [modified 
comparative fault statute] . . . a plaintiff who suffers $100,000 in damages because of an automobile 
accident for which he was forty-five percent at fault would recover $55,000.  If the jury were also 
to conclude that the plaintiff’s failure promptly to seek medical attention following the accident—
perhaps the prototypical example of avoidable consequences—was the cause of $15,000 of his 
injuries, it would reduce the award to $40,000.  If, however, the jury was instructed that the failure 
to seek medical help was contributory negligence, it might find that the plaintiff was sixty percent 
culpable, leading it to deny the plaintiff any recovery.”); Ostrowski v. Azzara, 111 N.J. 429, 441, 
545 A.2d 148, 153–54 (1988) (explaining that “we must avoid the indiscriminate application of the 
doctrine of comparative negligence (with its fifty percent qualifier for recovery) when the doctrines 
of avoidable consequences . . . apply.”); DOBBS ET AL., supra note 33, at 405; John R. 
Grier, Rethinking the Treatment of Mitigation of Damages Under the Iowa Comparative Fault Act 
in Light of Tanberg v. Ackerman Inv. Co., 77 IOWA L. REV. 1913, 1923–24 (1992) (mistakenly 
  
414 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80:380 
 
argument, there is a risk that “by combining the plaintiff’s fault in causing 
the accident with her fault in failing to [avoid consequences], the court may 
be required to bar the plaintiff’s claim altogether under the modified system 
of comparative fault.”169  One commentator provides an example of this 
injustice: 
[C]onsider the hypothetical in which the defendant was solely 
responsible for creating a $30,000 injury . . . . Subsequent to the 
accident, however, the plaintiff was solely at fault for increasing 
damages by $70,000 . . . . The jury in a pure comparative fault 
system would determine that the plaintiff’s damages totaled 
$100,000, but because the plaintiff caused $70,000 of the damage, 
the damage award must be reduced by $70,000.  By assessing 
seventy percent of the total fault to the plaintiff and thirty percent 
of the total fault to the defendant, the plaintiff recovers $30,000, 
the same amount recovered under contributory negligence. In a 
modified comparative fault system, the same instruction given in a 
pure comparative fault system results in a complete bar to the 
hypothetical plaintiff’s recovery since the plaintiff’s total fault is 
greater than fifty percent.170 
This hypothetical fails to appreciate, however, the first step in 
apportionment, causal apportionment, which requires disaggregating the 
plaintiff’s harm based on each indivisible injury, as explained in Part II.A.171  
Recall that apportionment for one discrete item of harm is independent of 
apportionment for another.172  The hypothetical then incorrectly specifies that 
the plaintiff is solely responsible for the enhanced harm.  At a minimum, the 
jury would likely decide that, as a matter of fact on scope of liability grounds, 
both parties are responsible for the enhanced injury.173  Obviously, liability 
for the initial harm would be assigned entirely to the defendant who is the 
sole tortious cause of it.  Liability for the enhanced harm, however, would be 
 
suggesting that the integration of avoidable consequences into comparative fault in a modified 
comparative fault system would completely bar plaintiffs from recovery if their enhanced harms 
amounted to more than fifty percent of their total damages). 
 169. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 33, at 405. 
 170. Grier, supra note 168, at 1923–24. 
 171. For a commentator who did appreciate the necessity of the two-step “causation then fault” 
apportionment, see Robert M. Ackerman, The Seat Belt Defense Reconsidered: A Return to 
Accountability in Tort Law?, 16 N.M. L. REV. 221, 232 (1986). 
 172. See supra notes 49 & 50.   
 173. As explained supra in Part III.C, a plaintiff is typically not solely responsible for his or her 
enhanced harms since the defendant is also a factual cause of the enhanced harm.  On the other 
hand, if the author meant that the plaintiff engaged in some unrelated activity—say, drag racing on 
a city street—that resulted in new injuries rather than enhanced injuries, the sole attribution to the 
plaintiff would be correct.  The latter interpretation seems implausible given that the article is about 
mitigation of damages. 
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apportioned between the plaintiff and defendant, but based on an assessment 
of comparative fault rather than, as specified in the hypothetical, on the ratio 
of the damages between the two harm items.  As such, the correct approach 
to the hypothetical would apportion all of the damages for the initial harm to 
the defendant, since the plaintiff’s fault in failing to mitigate had no role in 
that initial harm.  The damages for the enhanced harm—which, despite the 
terms of the hypothetical, were caused by both the plaintiff and defendant—
would then be divided among the parties in relation to their relative fault.  
Even if a modified comparative fault scheme were in operation and the 
plaintiff’s comparative fault for the enhanced harm was greater than 50%, the 
plaintiff would still recover $30,000 because whatever comparative fault 
assigned to the plaintiff for unreasonably enhancing the harm has no 
application to the apportionment for the original injury, which was not caused 
by that unreasonable conduct. 
PART IV: THE SOLUTION 
Avoidable consequences violates fundamental apportionment principles 
and reveals confused reasoning that fails to recognize the causal inquiry 
required by enhanced harms resulting from after-injury plaintiff 
negligence.174  How, then, can courts remedy this doctrine?  The answer is 
deceptively simple and has already been recognized by a number of 
 
 174. See supra Part III.B. 
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legislatures,175 courts,176 the American Law Institute,177 and the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.178  The answer: 
 
 175. See infra note 178 
 176. Jacobs v. Westgate, 766 So. 2d 1175, 1180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (“[W]e agree  . . . that 
the doctrine of comparative negligence  subsumes the concept of mitigation of damages.”); 
Williams v. Manchester, 864 N.E.2d 963, 986 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007), vacated in part on other grounds, 
888 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2008) (“Whether based upon principles relating to mitigation of damages, 
comparative fault, or assumption of the risk, we do not believe that a patient’s refusal to accept a 
reasonable medical treatment, suggested in an effort to alleviate the consequences of the physician’s 
negligence, should serve to completely defeat the patient’s recovery for those injuries proximately 
caused by the physician’s negligent acts.”) (internal citations omitted); Greenwood v. Mitchell, 621 
N.W.2d 200, 208 (Iowa 2001) (instructing the court on remand to use a comparative fault analysis 
for the enhanced harm that resulted from the plaintiff’s post-injury negligence); Maunz v. Perales, 
76 P.3d 1027, 1034 (Kan. 2003) (“[I]n Cox v. Lesko . . . this court permitted a jury to consider as 
plaintiff’s fault—not just as failure to mitigate damages—her failure to complete doctor-ordered 
physical therapy when evidence indicated her inaction exacerbated her damages.”) (internal citation 
omitted); Christopherson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 284, 354 N.W.2d 845, 848 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) 
(employing comparative fault to the plaintiff’s enhanced harm, which resulted from the plaintiff’s 
decision to teach gymnastics weeks after suffering severe leg injuries in contravention of her 
doctor’s orders); Love v. Park Lane Med. Ctr., 737 S.W.2d 720, 725 (Mo. 1987) (“The [Uniform 
Comparative Fault Act (which the court adopted)] therefore covers the concept of avoidable 
consequences and provides that for a particular injury that could have been avoided by the 
plaintiff . . . the amount will be diminished proportionately according to the comparative fault of 
the parties.”); Lynch v. Scheininger, 744 A.2d 113, 129 (N.J. 2000) (“[W]e held that under the 
doctrine of avoidable consequences a plaintiff’s post-negligence conduct that increased the risk of 
harm from defendant’s negligence could be considered by the jury as fault-based conduct that would 
reduce plaintiff’s damages but would not bar recovery . . . We cited with approval the Uniform 
Comparative Fault Act . . . , which includes in its definition of fault an “unreasonable failure to 
avoid an injury or to mitigate damages.”) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. Intuitive Surgical, 
Inc., 389 P.3d 517, 530 (Wash. 2017) (“Washington law states that the plaintiff’s failure to 
mitigate can be considered under the comparative fault statute.”).  
 177. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 
2000) (“No rule about mitigation of damages or avoidable consequences categorically forgives a 
plaintiff of this type of conduct or categorically excludes recovery.”). 
 178. Unif. Comp. Fault Act § 1 (1977) (defining “fault” in fault apportionment to include 
avoidable consequences, endorsing the idea that after-injury plaintiff conduct should be used when 
assigning relative party fault rather than barring plaintiff recovery); Unif. Apportionment of Tort 
Responsibility Act § 3 (2002).  Alaska, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Indiana, and Washington have 
adopted the Uniform Comparative Fault Act’s definition for “fault,” which includes avoidable 
consequences as a factor in comparative fault analyses. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.17.900 (2020); 
IOWA CODE § 668.1 (2020); MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (2020); IND. CODE § 34-6-2-45 (2020); WASH. 
REV. CODE § 4.22.015 (2020); Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11, 18 (Mo. 1983).  Similarly, the 
Kentucky Supreme Court has endorsed the UCFA’s definition of fault. Wemyss v. Coleman, 729 
S.W.2d 174, 178 (Ky. 1987) (“We have already adopted § 2 of the Uniform Comparative Fault 
Act in Hilen v. Hays, supra, and it follows . . . we should adopt the definition of “fault” as utilized 
in § 1 of that Act, so that the fabric of our law shall be whole, rather than inconsistent and 
conflicting.”).  In addition, North Dakota adopted a definition of “fault” that includes avoidable 
consequences.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-01 (2020) (“‘[F]ault’ includes . . . [the] failure to 
exercise reasonable care to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages.”).  Among these states, the 
Indiana Supreme Court has interpreted its comparative fault statute to include only plaintiff 
misconduct that precedes or coincides with the initial injury.  Kocher v. Getz, 824 N.E.2d 671, 675 
(Ind. 2005). 
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Enhanced harm due to the plaintiff’s unreasonable after-injury conduct 
should be apportioned between the plaintiff and defendant based on 
comparative fault, rather than be apportioned solely to the plaintiff. 
In Langlois v. Town of Proctor,179 the Vermont Supreme Court 
explained the rationale behind this approach, writing that  
[t]he underlying premise of comparative responsibility is that a 
plaintiff’s negligence should reduce, not bar, the plaintiff’s 
recovery for any damages caused both by that conduct and by the 
defendant’s conduct . . . [a] plaintiff’s failure to [avoid 
consequences] should no longer constitute a bar to recovering 
those damages.180   
Courts, then, should simply follow the blueprints set out in the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability,181 the Uniform 
Comparative Fault Act,182 and Part II of this Article, breaking down each 
plaintiff harm into its indivisible components and then apportioning fault 
among those responsible for each harm using comparative fault.183  
The Iowa Supreme Court, in Greenwood v. Mitchell,184 recommended 
providing the factfinder separate verdict sheets for each of the plaintiff’s 
indivisible harms to aid in their apportionment task.185  As such, the factfinder 
in an avoidable consequences case would have one verdict sheet for the 
plaintiff’s initial injury and another for the enhanced harm.186  This approach 
clearly communicates to the factfinder that the apportionment mix for each 
indivisible harm can differ depending on the parties responsible for each 
harm and the role their tortious conduct played in causing that harm.  
As mentioned in Part I, the vast majority of courts continue to apply 
avoidable consequences without appreciating or confronting its 
inconsistency with comparative fault.187  Nevertheless, a handful of courts 
 
 179. 113 A.3d 44 (Vt. 2014). 
 180. Id. at 55 (quoting the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 
3 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2000)) (dicta). 
 181. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY §§ 1–9 (AM. LAW INST. 
2000). 
 182. Unif. Comp. Fault Act § 1–3 (1977). 
 183. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 8 (AM. LAW INST. 
2000). 
 184. 621 N.W.2d 200 (Iowa 2001). 
 185. Id. at 208.  
 186. Id. 
 187. See supra Part I.  Curiously, some Louisiana courts employ apportion loss due to avoidable 
consequences based on proportional principles.  E.g., Thomas v. Boyd, 245 So. 3d 308, 331–32 (La. 
Ct. App. 2017) (jury reduced the plaintiff’s damages by 55% for failing to seek after-injury medical 
treatment); Ober v. Champagne, 166 So. 3d 254, 258 (La. Ct. App. 2014) (jury reduced the 
plaintiff’s damages by 15% for failing to mitigate his after-injury damages). Nevertheless, while 
these courts have allowed juries to apportion plaintiffs’ after-injury enhanced harms in accordance 
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have been confronted with the conflict between the two doctrines and 
resolved the relationship between comparative fault and avoidable 
consequences.  Of those courts, eight modified their treatment of avoidable 
consequences to align with comparative fault’s apportionment principles, and 
another expressed approval for doing so in dicta.188  The remaining three 
courts,189 however, decided to retain the traditional iteration of avoidable 
consequences notwithstanding comparative fault.  Two of those courts 
provided no substantive rationale for their position.  The Michigan Court of 
Appeals decided not to reform avoidable consequences because neither the 
state legislature nor the Michigan Supreme Court had expressed any intent to 
modify avoidable consequences in light of the adoption of comparative 
fault.190  While this is an understandable rationale by an intermediate 
appellate court respecting existing Supreme Court precedent, it reflects only 
a commitment to the hierarchy of appellate courts and not to avoidable 
consequences.  In addition, the Texas Supreme Court expressly endorsed the 
traditional avoidable consequences rule in dicta.191  In doing so, however, the 
court provided no explanation for its position.192 
The only court that has critically examined comparative fault’s effects 
on avoidable consequences and upheld the traditional avoidable 
consequences rule is the Indiana Supreme Court in Kocher v. Getz, discussed 
 
with comparative fault mechanisms, they have done so seemingly without awareness that avoidable 
consequences and comparative fault conflict.  Indeed, these cases provide no discussion of the 
interaction between the two doctrines.  
 188. See supra note 176.  
 189. See Kocher v. Getz, 824 N.E.2d 671, 675 (Ind. 2005); Braverman v. Granger, 844 N.W.2d 
485, 491 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014); Nabors Well Servs., Ltd. v. Romero, 456 S.W.3d 553 (Tex. 2015). 
 190. Braverman v. Granger, 844 N.W.2d 485, 491 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014). 
 191. Nabors Well Servs., Ltd. v. Romero, 456 S.W.3d 553, 564 (Tex. 2015) (rejecting, in dicta, 
that comparative fault analysis be applied to avoidable consequences). 
 192. The court wrote: “A plaintiff’s post-occurrence failure to mitigate his damages [i.e., failure 
to avoid consequences] operates as a reduction of his damages award and is not considered in the 
responsibility apportionment.  It is only the plaintiff’s pre-occurrence, injury-causing conduct that 
should be considered in the fault apportionment.”  Id.  Notably, the court provided no additional 
explanation.  Curiously, prior case law in Texas provided that in strict products liability cases, 
avoidable consequences was to be included in the comparative assessment: “[T]he system we adopt 
will allow comparison of plaintiff’s conduct, whether it is characterized as assumption of risk, 
misuse, or failure to mitigate or avoid damages, with the conduct or product of a defendant, whether 
the suit combines crashworthiness or other theories of strict products liability, breach of warranty, 
or negligence.”  Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 428 (Tex. 1984) (citing to the 
Uniform Comparative Fault Act § 1 (1977)). Duncan’s comparative scheme, however, was 
displaced by the Texas legislature’s adoption of TEX. CIV. CODE ANN. § 33.002 in 1987. Sky View 
at Las Palmas, LLC v. Mendez, 555 S.W.3d 101, 107 n.7 (Tex. 2018), opinion corrected on 
reh’g, (Sept. 28, 2018).  The statute makes no mention of avoidable consequences. See TEX. CIV. 
CODE ANN. § 33.002.  We cannot fathom why the Texas Supreme court, in dicta, took a different 
stance regarding avoidable consequences in Nabors without providing an explanation. 
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above.193  The Kocher court, however, confused the causal inquiry in tort law, 
as explained in Part III.B.  Thus, the court upheld avoidable consequences by 
ignoring the causes of the plaintiff’s harm, instead focusing on the causes of 
the initial accident.194  As we write this Article, the remaining jurisdictions 
continue to apply avoidable consequences as they did before adopting 
comparative fault, likely due to the belief that the doctrines—one a tort 
doctrine and the other a remedial doctrine—are unrelated.195  Given, 
however, that most courts that have confronted the interplay between 
avoidable consequences and comparative fault have shifted to accommodate 
comparative fault, it may only be a matter of time—although considerable 
time196—before more courts recognize the inherent tension between one 
doctrine that apportions responsibility according to relative fault and another 
that apportions responsibility entirely to one of two responsible parties.  
PART V: WHERE’S THE BEEF; ISN’T THIS ALL OBVIOUS? 
We hope that readers who have reached this point are thinking that what 
we write is all so obvious: It is as unfair to bar a plaintiff from enhanced-
harm recovery under avoidable consequences—when both the plaintiff and 
the defendant are responsible for that harm—as it is to bar a plaintiff from 
recovering for any injury caused both by the defendant’s and plaintiff’s 
conduct.  Why, authors, have you spent so much effort beating a dead horse? 
One answer is that the majority of courts adverted to in Part IV have not 
yet confronted nor appreciated the unfairness of allocating all avoidable 
consequences harm to the plaintiff.  A second is to emphasize the importance 
of causal apportionment when apportioning liability, a principle that far too 
many courts do not appear to fully appreciate.  The third answer, a stunning 
one, is that, as this Article goes to press, the Reporters for the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Remedies have circulated a Preliminary Draft that seeks to 
perpetuate avoidable consequences as a remedial doctrine that bars plaintiffs 
from enhanced-harm recovery.197  These Reporters do so notwithstanding 
 
 193. 824 N.E.2d 671, 675 (Ind. 2005). 
 194. See supra Part III.B. 
 195. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. There are, of course, a small number of 
exceptions.  See supra note 187 (explaining that Louisiana courts employ avoidable consequences 
as though it were comparative fault, but do so without discussing or resolving the conflicts between 
the doctrines). 
 196. We base this hypothesis on the fact that now, almost fifty years after comparative fault was 
adopted, only a dozen courts have addressed the tension between comparative fault and avoidable 
consequences.  The same is true of other doctrines—such as alternative causation—where, arguably, 
comparative fault requires reconsideration but judicial appreciation of that need is almost 
nonexistent.  See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.  
 197. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: REMEDIES § 7 (Preliminary Draft No. 1 Oct. 14,  2020). 
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and fully aware of the apportionment principles explained above.  So, we 
respond.  If the learned Remedies Reporters do not give credence to 
apportionment principles, perhaps our laying them out here will help courts 
rescue avoidable consequence from the remedies kidnappers.  
Professor Oscar S. Gray was an advocate for progressive tort reform and 
understood that the widespread adoption of comparative fault would require 
courts and commenters alike to rethink doctrines that once seemed 
indisputable.198  As both a teacher and scholar, Professor Gray had a shrewd 
mind and could not abide weak, flabby, and incoherent arguments.199  Indeed, 
as discussed in Part I, Professor Gray and his coauthors noted the logical 
inconsistencies between avoidable consequences and comparative fault 
decades ago.200  
Tort reform swept away contributory negligence, replacing it with 
comparative fault because of a consensus that contributory negligence was 
simply unfair.211   That sense of injustice was based on the idea that, when 
two persons act unreasonably to cause harm, the cost of that harm should not 
be imposed on just one of them; rather it should be shared between them.  
Employing avoidable consequences to bar a plaintiff from recovering for the 
enhanced harm caused, in part, by the defendant echoes precisely the 
unfairness that finally sounded the death knell for contributory negligence.  
It is past time for avoidable consequences to face the same fate.  Professor 
Gray, we know, would wholeheartedly approve. 
 
 198. A Celebration of the Life for Oscar Gray, UNIV. MD. (Dec. 10, 2019), 
https://mediasite.umaryland.edu/Mediasite/Play/130a00107c5a453dbefa8e0074e0bf641d. 
 199. Id.   
 200. “In principle, the plaintiff’s failure to take reasonable steps to avoid certain damages caused 
by the defendant’s negligence should serve merely to reduce the plaintiff’s recovery for those 
damages in a comparative negligence jurisdiction, rather than to bar such recovery.”  FOWLER V. 
HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS § 25.4, at 
604 (3d ed. 2007). 
